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Hate Crimes and Jury Decision Making: An Exploratory Study of Underlying 
Motivations of How Mock Jurors Are Influenced by Extralegal Factors 
Vimbai Mudimu 
ABSTRACT 
Statistics show that hate crimes continue to occur in United States, inciting fear 
and intimidation in minority communities (Petrosino, 1999; Torres, 1999; Saucier et al., 
2006; Nolan et al., 2002; Jacobs & Potter, 1997).  Although hate crime legislation has 
been passed, very little research has assessed what impact it has. This is particularly true 
for jury decision making.  The aim of this study was to examine the main effects of type 
of crime (hate versus non-hate), offender-victim racial composition (African-
American/Caucasian), and the interaction between these two variables on ratings of guilt 
likelihood, deserved punishment, and sentence recommendations after controlling for 
offender dangerousness, witness credibility, and hate motivation.  The first hypothesis 
assumed that differences in guilt and hate crime adjudications would emerge across the 
experimental conditions.  The second hypothesis indicated that dangerousness, and hate 
motivation would exert significant influence on deserved punishment and sentence 
recommendations; while witness credibility would exert influence on guilt adjudication.  
The third and fourth hypothesis stated that there would be no main effects of type of 
crime (hate versus non-hate) and offender-victim racial composition (African-
American/Caucasian) on ratings of guilt likelihood, deserved punishment, and sentence 
v 
recommendations.  The fifth hypothesis suggested that there would be interaction effects 
between type of crime and offender-victim racial composition on ratings of guilt 
likelihood, deserved punishment, and recommended sentence after controlling for 
dangerousness, hate motivation, and witness credibility.  Results indicated that there were 
no main effects for type of crime, offender-victim racial composition, or the interaction 
between these two variables on ratings of guilt likelihood, deserved punishment, and 
sentence recommendations.  There was a significant interaction effect on ratings of guilt 
likelihood for aggravated battery; however this interaction disappeared after controlling 
for offender dangerousness, witness credibility, and hate motivation.  Dangerousness and 
hate motivation appeared to exert influence on the study outcomes.  Overall, the findings 
were not congruent with prior research. It appeared that the covarying factors seemed to 
exert significant influence on the study outcomes; thus further study is warranted.
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 In 2006, rising racial tensions in Jena, Louisiana lead to a big media story now 
known as “The Jena Six Story” (Democracy Now, 2007).  It began when a student asked 
for permission to sit under a tree commonly known as the ‘white tree’ (a tree where 
Caucasian students gathered).  The following day, students observed three nooses 
hanging from the tree.  The responsible Caucasian students were suspended for three days 
after school administrators determined that the act was just a prank.  Subsequent to the 
incident, six African-American students attacked one Caucasian student.  The Caucasian 
victim was sent to hospital for medical clearance, released the same day, and seen at a 
school function that evening.  The six African-American students responsible for the 
attack were arrested and charged with attempted second-degree murder and conspiracy to 
commit murder.  The charges would leave the students (ranging from 15 to 17 years of 
age) facing between twenty and one hundred years in jail.  The Jena Six story has 
captured national media attention and caused tremendous racial tension (Democracy 
Now, 2007).  Is this incident an example of racial unfairness in the current judicial 
system?  Should the incident where Caucasian students hung nooses be classified as a 
hate crime? Or should the attack be prosecuted as a hate crime?  Or should both incidents 
be considered as hate crimes?  All these questions remain unanswered as the legal 
process continues.   
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Racially motivated crimes (such as the Jena Six Story) have occurred in great 
magnitude in American history (Petrosino, 1999; Perlmutter, 1991; Levin & McDevitt 
1993).  It is well documented that prejudice and hate have been an issue in the United 
States for centuries (Franklin & Moss, 1994; Fredrickson, 2002; Apel, 2004; Harris, 
1984) and remains pervasive in today’s society (Feagin & Sikes, 1994; Bonilla-Silva, 
2001).  Discriminatory and violent victimization against African-Americans dates back to 
slavery (Franklin & Moss, 1994; Berlin, 2003; Hacker, 1996).  African-Americans were 
viewed as inferior, uncivilized, and heathens, views that provided rationalizations for 
using them as slaves (Petrosino, 1999).  In the slavery era, African-Americans were 
dehumanized as they were stripped of their rights, mandated to perform labor, and forced 
to live in treacherous conditions (Franklin & Moss, 1994).  Criminal acts, such as assault, 
torture, kidnapping, rape, and psychological abuse occurred during this period (Petrosino, 
1999).   
The post-emancipation period was characterized as the “Jim Crow Era,” a time in 
history when numerous lynchings occurred (Soule 1992; Tolnay & Beck, 1992; Beck & 
Tolnay, 1990).  During this era, the “Jim Crow Laws” mandated racial segregation by 
prohibiting African-Americans from using the same facilities as Caucasians, such as 
schools, transportation, and housing.  Additionally, African-Americans were prohibited 
from voting and seeking economic opportunities (for example, business ownership).  The 
laws also allowed private acts of mass racial violence, such as lynchings (Franklin & 
Moss, 1994).  Lynching was described as murdering an accused person without due 
process of the law (Waldrep, 2000; Petrosino, 1999).  Lynchings caused discouragement 
from overcoming poverty, owning real property, employment, pursuing education, and 
 3 
voting (Washington, 1899; Aldrich, 1979; Torres, 1999).  African-Americans were 
essentially treated as second-class citizens (Franklin & Moss, 1994).  Subsequent to the 
“Jim Crow Era” was the civil rights movement where African-Americans fought against 
racial discrimination and demanded freedom, respect, dignity, and economic and social 
equality (Lewis, 2000; Williams, 1987; McWhorter 2000).  Although African-Americans 
gained civil rights in American society, they continued to experience discrimination 
(Feagin & Sikes, 1994; Bonilla-Silva, 2001).   
Historically, murder, assault, rape, and theft were categorized as criminal acts; 
however the racial motivation behind those criminal acts was not (Petrosino, 1999).  
Thus, while crimes motivated by racial hatred occurred in the past, the criminalization of 
hate has only recently occurred (Petrosino, 1999).  In the 1980s, laws were enacted and 
definitions established to address hate crimes in the United States (Petrosino, 1999; 
Lawrence, 1999).  Hate crimes were defined as bias motivated criminal acts against a 
person or property (Petrosino, 1999; Torres, 1999; Saucier et al., 2006; Jacobs & Potter, 
1997; Craig 1999; Nolan et al. 2002; Marcus-Newhall et al., 2002). 
The enactment of hate crime laws set the stage for cultural and structural changes 
as there was an observable shift from the slavery and post-emancipation era to the post-
civil rights movement era, a shift depicted by criminalizing racially motivated criminal 
acts (Nolan et al., 2002).  The passage of hate crime laws demonstrated recognition that 
hate crimes were uniquely different from ordinary crimes as they caused irreparable 
damage to victims and communities, therefore warranting distinction.  Although the shift 
in history has been marked by laws that mandate criminalizing hate crimes, surprisingly, 
very little attention in the social sciences has been directed in examining hate crimes and 
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jury decision making.  Previous researchers have focused on race as an extralegal factor 
(i.e., as an aspect unrelated to the evidence presented in a legal case) associated with 
influencing jury decision making.  However, a literature review revealed only four 
research studies explicitly focusing on jurors’ perceptions of hate crimes.   
The present exploratory study seeks to fill the gaps in the existing literature by 
examining jurors’ perceptions of hate crimes to evaluate whether extralegal factors are 
taken into account in juror decision making.  The aim is to establish whether the 
independent effects of race or type of crime (hate crime vs. non-hate) influences mock 
juror’s decision making in guilt adjudication and sentencing recommendations.  The 
study will answer three specific questions.  Are there racial differences in adjudication 
and sentencing in hate crime and non-hate crime conditions?  Does race impact the 
perception of crime severity according to the type of crime (hate crime or non-hate 
crime)?  Is the perception of a hate crime dependent on the victim’s race?   
The next chapter will examine the definitions, laws, prevalence, and social factors 
that influence hate crimes.  Following this in-depth discussion, the third chapter will 
elaborate on extralegal factors and outline previous research conducted in race and jury 
decision making.  Additionally, the chapter will review the scant research specific to hate 
crimes and jury decision making.  The fourth chapter will review the methods, the fifth 
chapter will outline the results, and finally the sixth chapter will summarize the 
discussion and conclusion. 
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Chapter 2 
Overview of Hate Crimes 
Creation of Legislation for Hate Crimes 
 Some have suggested that the motivation to enact hate crime laws was encouraged 
by triggering events and movements in the 1970s and 1980s, including the women’s 
rights, gay rights, and civil rights movements (Gerstenfeld, 2003; Cogen 2002; Nolan et 
al., 2002).  The Hate Crime Statistics Act (HCSA; 1990) was the first Federal hate crime 
law enacted to explicitly deal with racially motivated crimes (Torres, 1999; Saucier et al., 
2006; Craig, 1999; Craig & Waldo, 1996).  The HCSA required the attorney general to 
institute procedures and collect data regarding crimes such as murder, non-negligent 
manslaughter, intimidation, simple assault, aggravated assault, forcible rape, arson, and 
property crimes (destruction, damage, or vandalism of property) that showed clear 
evidence of motivation based on race, ethnicity, sexual orientation or religion (Nolan et 
al., 2002).  After the HCSA was established, the FBI created a program called the 
National Crime Data Collection program to collect data on hate crimes.  This program 
was an adjunct to the existing Uniform Crime Reporting Program (Nolan et al., 2002).  
Data are collected on the patterns, frequency, location, and extent of hate crimes in order 
to assist law enforcement, the legislature and communities to increase awareness on hate 
crimes (Jacobs & Potter, 1997).   
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The Hate Crime Statistics Act was followed by the Hate Crime Sentencing 
Enhancement Act (HCSEA) in 1994, which modified the US Sentencing Guidelines.  
This new law indicated that individuals who committed a hate crime would receive a 
harsher sentence of three offense levels higher than ordinary crimes, such as robbery or 
assault (Torres, 1999; Saucier et al., 2006; Craig, 1999).  That is, the sentence is 
automatically increased by a factor of three times. For example, a felony of the fourth 
degree is sentenced as a felony of the first degree.  The HCSEA specifically states that,  
If the finder of fact at trial or, in the case of a guilty plea,….the court at 
sentencing determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally 
selected any victim or any property as object of the offense because of the actual 
or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or 
sexual orientation for any person, an additional 3-level enhancement from [the 
base level offense] will apply (Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 1993).   
One such example of sentencing enhancement occurred in Wisconsin v. Mitchell 
(1993) where it was established that if the crime was motivated by prejudice because of 
the person’s race, ancestry, national origin, disability, sexual orientation, religion or color 
and committed against a person or property, the sentence was tripled.  Florida has 
instituted the sentencing enhancement law whereby punishments are enhanced for any 
felony or misdemeanor crime that is bias-motivated.  After the establishment of hate 
crime laws, several court hearings occurred that impacted how hate crimes were 
prosecuted in a courtroom.  The following section explores several court decisions that 
lead to judicial procedures for hate crimes. 
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Hate Crime Procedures 
 Over the last several years, some court decisions have impacted judicial 
procedures for hate crimes.  In Jones v. United States (1999) the defendant was sentenced 
to 25 years in prison for carjacking when the normal sentence was 10 years for that 
crime.  The outcome of this court hearing led to the conclusion that the sixth amendment 
to a defendant’s right to a jury trial was violated because the judge increased the 
sentence.  Consequently, sentence enhancements were only permitted after a jury had 
found beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence presented in the case warranted 
increased sentencing (526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215,1999).  This decision also resulted 
from the Almendarez-Torres v. United States (1998) case that had allowed increased 
sentencing based on prior convictions (523 U.S. 224, 118 S. Ct. 1219, 1998). In Apprendi 
v. New Jersey (2000), a court ruling was overturned after a judge increased sentencing on 
a defendant convicted of several weapon offenses against an African-American family 
because the judge found that this crime was motivated by race.  When this sentence was 
reversed, Justice Stevens indicated that other than prior convictions, all facts must be 
presented to a jury first and proved beyond a reasonable doubt before sentence 
enhancements can occur (530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2000).   
Some resistance by the courts was demonstrated during the Harris v. United 
States (2002) case that argued that a jury does not need to try a case presenting facts that 
mandate minimum sentencing.  While cases presented to the jury have an element of an 
aggravated crime that would allow an extension of the maximum sentencing guidelines, 
this was not the circumstance for cases that require minimum sentencing.  Judges could 
increase the sentence beyond the mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines with or 
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without the jury’s verdict.  However, Justice Stevens argued that greater punishment than 
is necessary would result if mandatory minimum sentences were increased (536 U.S. 545, 
122 S.Ct. 2406, 2002).   
In Blakey v. Washington (2004), the sentencing schemes involved crimes that 
were categorized and assigned penalties.  For instance, Class B felonies were assigned 
maximum sentences of 10 years.  However, specific crimes had smaller ‘standard 
ranges’; for instance kidnapping was classified as a Class B felony, however, it only 
carried a sentence range of 49 to 53 months.  In this case, the sentence was enhanced 
because the judge found that the defendant acted by ‘deliberate cruelty’; as such he 
received a 90 month sentence after being convicted of kidnapping.  Justice Scalia found 
this case unconstitutional because it exceeded the allowed statutory maximum of 53 
months based on the facts presented in the jury’s verdict (542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 
2004).  A similar issue was noted in United States v. Booker (2005), where the sentence 
was increased beyond the allowed mandatory maximums according to the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines based on judicial facts that were not presented to the jury.  Justice 
Breyer concluded that Guideline ranges should be advisory to allow the courts to impose 
sentences at the statutory maximums.  This meant that juries could authorize sentences up 
to the statutory maximum amounts (543 U.S. 220, 125 S.CT. 738, 2005). 
 In conclusion, the results of these court decisions mandated that sentencing 
enhancements be proven to a jury in all jurisdictions.  Additionally, sentencing guidelines 
could be increased to the statutory maximums to allow judges to decrease sentences as 
necessary and ensure that all jurisdictions remained within their maximum sentencing 
enhancement guidelines. Therefore, the history of these decisions allowed the Supreme 
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Court to delineate clear procedural guidelines to address the judicial system for hate 
crimes. 
 In the state of Florida, jurors are given specific instructions for aggravation of a 
crime by selecting a victim based on prejudice according to Florida Statute § 775.085.  
Instructions inform jurors to find the defendant guilty of the hate crime if they find the 
defendant accountable for the crime and believe that beyond a reasonable doubt the 
defendant selected the victim based on prejudice.  If jurors believe that the defendant 
committed the crime, but they not believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the intention of 
the crime was motivated by race, they are asked to find the defendant guilty of the crime 
only (775.085, Florida Statutes, Supp. 1998).   
After the jury finds that the defendants’ crime was motivated by an aggravating 
factor, the judge proceeds with sentencing according to the appropriate sentencing 
guidelines.  In Florida, according to Florida Statute Florida Statute § 775.085 (2007), 
judges follow the specific sentencing guidelines.  Crimes are reclassified as Florida law 
allows for sentencing enhancement for racially motivated criminal acts.  For instance, a 
misdemeanor of the second degree is reclassified to a misdemeanor of the first degree, a 
misdemeanor of the first degree is reclassified to a felony of the third degree, and a 
felony of the third degree is reclassified to a felony of the second degree (775.085, 
Florida Statutes, Supp. 1998), and so on. 
Overall, the state of Florida provides clear guidelines in accordance with federal 
guidelines for jurors hearing hate crimes and judges imposing sentences.  Since I have 
discussed laws and procedural definitions for hate crimes, an exploration of hate crime 
definitions shall follow.  Some researchers have identified multiple existing variations of 
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hate crime definitions.  The following section will describe the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
definition of a hate crime and the other definitions offered.  
Hate Crime Definitions 
While researchers have devised a number of similar definitions of a hate crime, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has clarified the definition of hate crimes by providing explicit 
language in the form of legislation.  Specifically, the definition offered in the Hate Crime 
Statistics Act is “a criminal offense committed against a person or property, which is 
motivated, in whole or in part, by the offender’s bias against race, religion, 
ethnic/national origin, or sexual orientation group” (28 U.S.C. 534 [Supp. IV 1996]).  
According to the FBI guidelines, the definition of bias is similar to that of prejudice, 
where bias is defined as ‘a preformed negative opinion or attitude toward a group of 
persons based on their race, religion, ethnicity/national origin, or sexual orientation’ 
(Jacobs & Potter, 1997).  However, definitions of hate crimes vary across jurisdictions 
(Torres, 1999; Saucier et al., 2006; Petrosino, 1999).  In some jurisdictions, the hate 
crime statutes include religion, race, color, and national origin as their legal definition of 
hate crimes, while other jurisdictions incorporated sexual orientation, physical handicap, 
and gender (Petrosino, 1999).  Saucier et al. (2006) indicated that criminal acts are 
determined and classified as hate crimes according to the words used at the time of the 
incident.  For example, a suspect who has committed an assault may have used the words 
‘you are not welcome in our neighborhood’.  Such a statement may be interpreted as 
racially prejudicial, which would result in the reclassification of the assault to a hate 
crime.  However, interpretation is subject to the judge’s decision of whether the words 
used during the assault are indicative of a hate crime.  Jacobs and Potter (1997) identify 
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that the term ‘hate crime’ is not congruent with its actual definition.  The argument is that 
while there is some overlap between hate and prejudice, the actual term ‘hate crime’ 
refers to criminal behavior that is motivated by prejudice, not hate (Jacobs & Potter, 
1997).  Prejudice is defined as either being a subconscious or conscious negative attitude 
or opinion about a specific class or group of people (Jacobs & Potter, 1997).   
Nolan et al. (2002) indicated that hate crimes are defined as a criminal offense 
committed as a result of extreme prejudice against an individual or a group of people.  
Craig (1999) defined hate crimes as the intentional selection of a victim based on 
prejudice or bias associated with actual or assumed status of the victim and performing an 
illegal act such as harassment, intimidation, verbal or physical assault, property damage, 
and murder.  The victim’s status may be based on membership of a racial, ethnic, and 
religious minority group, or being physically challenged, or type of sexual orientation.  
Torres (1999) defined hate crimes as crimes incited by hatred against the person because 
of the person’s race, national origin, ethnicity, disability, religion, and sexual orientation.  
Petrosino (1999) defined hate crimes as the majority group victimizing minority group 
members because of their racial and ethnic identity.  Other definitions of hate crimes 
include ‘words or actions intended to harm or intimidate an individual because of her or 
his membership in a minority group’ (Herek, 1989). 
Despite the various definitions proposed, all hate crimes have certain elements.  
They each note a criminal offense, and they all suggest prejudice as a precipitating factor.  
Accordingly, this study focused on racially motivated criminal acts.  Some researchers 
have proposed several different societal dynamics that provoke the occurrence of hate 
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crimes.  The following section explores several different theories suggesting why hate 
crimes occur. 
Social Factors That Might Promote an Environment Conducive to Hate Crimes  
 Several different factors have been offered as possible explanations for hate 
crimes against African-Americans.  Green et al. (1998) postulated that a change in the 
demographic composition of an area is one possible precipitator to hate crimes.  
Specifically, they found that the beginning stages of integration resulted in racial tensions 
that led to racially motivated crimes.  Specifically, racial tensions arose when ethnic 
minorities, such as African-Americans and Latinos, moved into predominantly Caucasian 
neighborhoods.  The tension was associated with Caucasians defending what they 
identified as their territory.  It is important to note, however, the tensions were most 
notable in the beginning stages of demographic change, and subsided thereafter. Greene 
et al. (1998) suggested that this was because those opposed to integration fled their 
neighborhoods and those who were amenable to the changes remained in the community. 
This suggests that there may be something specific to individual attitudes and beliefs that 
are important in understanding racial tension, and not simply changes in the demographic 
composition.   
Overall, racial tensions decline as communities became racially diverse, resulting 
in a decreased incidence of racially motivated crimes.  Although this suggestion has been 
made by Green et al., (1998), other researchers have found that African-Americans are 
still the most segregated minority group from Caucasians (Quillian & Pager, 2001).  
Caucasians prefer to live in neighborhoods with a very small percentage of African-
Americans.  African-American neighborhoods with young African-American men are 
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perceived as having more crimes, thus fueling racially segregated neighborhoods 
(Quillian & Pager, 2001).  Results from one study found that neighborhoods with a high 
percentage of young African-American men were associated with high crime rates 
(Quillian & Pager, 2001).  Thus, Caucasians tend to form this stereotype and are averse to 
African-American neighborhoods with a high percentage of young African-American 
men because of the perceived high crime rates, thereby reinforcing continued segregation 
(Quillian & Pager, 2001). 
 The social dominance theory is an alternative explanation for the occurrence of 
hate crimes.  The social dominance theory assumes that certain groups in society have 
more power than other groups.  These dominant groups attempt to maintain their social 
status, prefer a hierarchical arrangement, and have a propensity to display racial biases 
against the minority groups.  The socially dominant group tends to display discrimination 
against minority groups and show favoritism towards their own in-group members 
(Kemmelmeier, 2005).    
Another factor hypothesized to influence hate crimes is stereotyping.  Theories on 
racial stereotypes have indicated that stereotypes are motivated from the emotional need 
of one racial group to justify their position, relative to another racial group (Quillian & 
Pager, 2001).  Stereotypes of African-Americans have derived from the historical view of 
African-Americans as genetically inferior (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1997).  The modern 
stereotype of African-Americans is that African-Americans are more violent, aggressive, 
and likely to engage in criminal activity than any other ethnic minority group (Hurwitz & 
Peffley, 1997; Quillian & Pager, 2001; Peffley et al., 1997).  Stereotypes and beliefs 
about specific ethnic minorities are shaped from media influences.  The media has played 
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an instrumental role in portraying African-Americans as the violent underclass (Hurwitz 
& Peffley, 1997). The media more frequently portrays African-Americans as violent 
criminals as they are seen in mug shots, handcuffs, and in physical custody (Hurwitz & 
Peffley, 1997).  When a crime is violent in nature, Caucasians tend to find African-
Americans guilty and give more severe punishments because of the stereotype that 
African-Americans are aggressive, violent, and hostile (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1997).  
Moreover, researchers have found that racial prejudice is most pronounced against 
African-Americans in comparison to other ethnic minorities, such as Latinos (Barkan & 
Cohn, 2005).  Consequently, Caucasians that are more racially prejudiced and believe 
that African Americans are violent are more likely to want to support crime control 
policies that include harsher punishments for criminals.  As a result of this stereotype, 
African-Americans are generally more likely to be convicted of crimes in the criminal 
justice system (Austin & Erwin, 2000; Clear, 1994; Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2007; 
Gerstenfeld, 2003).              
Several other suggestions for the occurrence of hate crimes are related to the 
social climate, which includes unemployment, poor financial conditions, advertisements 
that are racially biased, radio talk show discussions, one’s own experiences with African-
Americans, or the use of racially criticizing language (Torres, 1999).  These broad social 
conditions may also influence other factors that are related to the occurrence of hate 
crimes. For instance, individuals may blame others when they have experienced a 
negative event in their lives, such as losing a job.  This is a phenomenon known as 
scapegoating.  This could potentially result in the perpetrator seeking a victim of a 
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minority group which the perpetrator seeks to ‘blame’, thus resulting in a hate crime 
(Torres, 1999).   
Overall, several different researchers have suggested multiple social factors that 
promote an atmosphere of racial tension, potentially resulting in hate crimes.  The 
following section will explore to what magnitude hate crimes occur in the United States. 
Prevalence of Hate Crimes 
While Torres (1999) identified that hate crimes have substantially increased since 
1990, Jacobs and Potter (1997) argued that hate crimes occurred at a greater frequency in 
the past during the Jim Crow lynching era.  The difference from the past to the recent 
years is distinguished by a society that has become sensitive to prejudice and is motivated 
to criminalize prejudicial acts (Jacobs & Potter, 1997).  The Hate Crime Statistics Act of 
1990 provided guidelines for recording and documenting hate crimes.  The HCSA 
mandated that law enforcement agencies gather data related to hate crime statistics in 
their respective jurisdictions to report to the Hate Crime Reporting Unit.  The statistics 
derived as a result of the Hate Crime Statistics Act have revealed that hate crimes 
continue to occur in the United States.   
As delineated above, hate crimes are “normal” crimes that have the additional 
element of prejudice.  As such, any crime – violent or property – can be classified as a 
hate crime.  Thus, crimes such as murder or vandalism that have the underlying 
motivation of prejudice can be classified as a hate crime.  Hate crimes generally tend to 
be brutal and more frequently occur against individuals as opposed to property (Saucier 
et al., 2006).  Hate crimes that occur against individuals include murder, rape, aggravated 
assaults, simple assaults, criminal intimidation, and robbery (Office of Attorney General 
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Bob Butterworth, 1995; Nolan et al., 2002; Saucier et al., 2006; Green et al., 1998; 
Torres, 1999).  Nolan et al. (2002) reported that in the 1999 hate crime statistics provided 
by the FBI annual crime report, 66% percent of hate crimes were categorized as assaults 
and intimidations reported against persons (Nolan et al., 2002).  Data from the 2002 
Uniform Crime Reports provided similar information.  Approximately 65% of hate 
crimes were against persons versus approximately 35% that were property crimes 
(Saucier et al., 2006).   
Researchers have identified that African-Americans and Hispanics constitute a 
high proportion of victims of hate crimes in comparison to the majority groups, with 
African-Americans being the minority group more frequently targeted for hate crimes 
(Green et al., 1998; Saucier et al., 2006).  Researchers reviewed the 1996 statistics and 
the 1999 FBI’s annual hate crime report and found that anti-race was the most frequent 
form of bias, where 61% of hate crimes were motivated by racial prejudice (Nolan et al., 
2002; Torres, 1999).  Statistics show that over 50% of hate crimes are committed against 
African-Americans and 18% are anti-White (Jacobs & Potter, 1997; Torres, 1999; Nolan 
et al., 2002; Saucier et al., 2006).   Additionally, 68% of perpetrators are Caucasian, 
reflecting that Caucasians are more frequently committing hate crimes (Nolan et al., 
2002; Jacobs & Potter, 1997).  Moreover, an analysis of data between the years of 1992 
and 1996 revealed that there was a 52% increase in hate crimes against African-
Americans (Torres, 1999).  Thus, it is necessary to study hate crimes, particularly among 
African-Americans, as statistics reveal that African-Americans are more frequently the 
target of hate crimes than other racial groups and hate crimes continue to increase (Jacobs 
& Potter, 1997; Saucier et al., 2006; Green et al., 1998; Nolan et al., 2002; Torres, 1999).   
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The current study was conducted in Tampa, Florida, thus is it necessary to explore 
hate crime statistics specific to this state.  The statistics on hate crimes in Florida are 
congruent with the statistics reported across the United States.  Information from the 
Attorney General of Florida indicated that the most commonly reported motivation for 
hate crimes was race (2006).  The 2006 hate crime report in Florida indicated that 55% of 
hate crimes in Florida were racially motivated hate crimes.  Other hate crimes reported 
were crimes against religion, ethnicity, and sexual orientation.  Additionally, the hate 
crimes report showed that hate crimes more frequently occurred against persons.  
Approximately 66% of hate crimes occurred against persons and the remaining 34% were 
property crimes.  The hate crimes against persons and property included acts such as 
forcible sex offenses, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, arson, simple assault, 
intimidation, and vandalism.  Forty-four percent of the hate crimes reported in 2006 were 
aggravated assault, thus showing that this was the most common hate crime committed 
that year.  In Hillsborough County, there were two different agencies reporting hate 
crimes, including the Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office and the Tampa Police 
Department.  The Hillsborough County Sheriff’s office reported five aggravated assaults 
and three intimidations.  The Tampa Police Department reported three aggravated 
assaults, eleven simple assaults, one intimidation, and two vandalisms (Office of 
Attorney Bill McCollum, 2006).  Overall, the statistics show that hate crimes continue to 
occur, particularly against African-Americans.  Despite the relatively high numbers of 
hate crimes, they are likely to be underestimates as researchers have suggested that often 
times hate crimes go unreported (McDevitt et al. 2000).  Although these data indicate 
hate crimes are, indeed, a persistent problem, several researchers have presented issues 
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with hate crime reporting and other disagreements related to hate crime concepts.  The 
following section focuses on this.   
Controversies Related to Hate Crime Reporting, Laws, and Legislation 
 While the Hate Crime Statistics Act has established a systematic way of collecting 
data, some researchers have noted that there is ambiguity in the guidelines.  Researchers 
postulate that accurate data collection is compromised because of this ambiguity (Jacobs 
& Potter, 1997).  One argument indicates that overall crime data collection efforts are 
inadequate as agencies responsible for reporting hate crime statistics often do not 
accurately report this data. Thus the statistics recorded do not accurately reflect the 
incidence of hate crimes.  McDevitt et al. (2000) identified that hate crimes are 
underreported, representing fewer hate crimes than what is actually occurring in today’s 
society (McDevitt et al., 2000; Cogan, 2002).  Although some agencies do not report hate 
crime statistics, researchers have noted that the hate crime reporting system is relatively 
new and continues to improve (Jacobs & Potter, 1997).     
Some researchers have suggested there is no need to have explicit legislation for 
hate crimes.  Torres (1999) highlights that some studies indicate that hate crime reporting 
has not contributed towards the betterment of society in terms of improving law 
enforcement practices or better understanding crime, prejudice, or prejudice-motivated 
crimes.  Researchers found that some people believe that hate crime laws are a violation 
of the 1st Amendment because ‘a crime is a crime’.  That is, the crime committed is 
already being punished, and there is no need to respond to it differently based on the 
offender’s motivation (Saucier et al., 2006; Gerstenfeld, 2003; Jacobs & Potter, 1997; 
Torres, 1999).  The belief is that hate crime laws are essentially punishing the individual 
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for inappropriate thinking because of their opinions, thoughts, and values (Freeman 
1992/93; Gellman 1992/93; Jacobs & Potter, 1997).  
Another criticism of hate crime legislation involves sentencing.  Some researchers 
believe that believe that enacting harsher sentences for hate crimes may actually affect 
minority groups more adversely if a minority group member commits a hate crime 
against a member of the majority group (e.g., an African-American offender committing 
a crime against a Caucasian individual; Jacobs & Potter, 1997).   Research has shown a 
trend whereby minority groups receive harsher sentences than members of the majority 
groups; specifically African-Americans are found guilty more frequently and receive 
harsher sentences in comparison to Caucasians (Saucier et al., 2006; Gerstenfeld, 2003).  
Consequently, the fear is that a similar punishment pattern will emerge with respect to 
hate crimes.   
Finally, Jacobs & Potter (1997) believe that the enactment of hate crimes laws 
politicizes the crime problem and divides social groups instead of bringing them together.  
The argument is such that hate crime laws will compel society to focus on racial aspects 
associated with the crime instead of focusing on the crime committed. This will result in 
increased racial tensions and societies will experience division and polarization.  
However, this line of reasoning appears to be flawed in some respects.  For example, 
statistics show that hate crimes continue to occur despite efforts of integration and 
equality, which is an issue that needs to be addressed.  Simply discussing and increasing 
awareness regarding hate crimes does not polarize social groups.  In addition to hate 
crimes stemming from racial strife, the act of the hate crime further divides social groups 
because the hate crime is a public display of racial contention, which intimidates an entire 
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community.  Hate crimes cause distress to the minority groups that experience prejudice 
secondary to the hate crime.  Thus, ensuring conviction of hate crime perpetrators and 
increasing sentences will act as a deterrent effect to lower the incidence of hate crimes in 
today’s society (Saucier et al., 2006).   
Overall, several individuals have identified issues related to hate crime data 
collection, laws, and legislation.  Nonetheless, the laws are still in place today and 
agencies continue to collect data on hate crimes in their respective jurisdictions.  
Essentially, some researchers find that while hate crimes may be a simple notion to 
understand, it is a very difficult concept to enact in society today because of the many 
different challenges faced by hate crimes (Saucier et al. 2006).  
Summary 
The previous review discussed the definitions, prevalence, possible sources, and 
controversies of hate crimes.  All of this information suggests that hate crimes are a 
serious problem in the United States that needs to be addressed.  Further, as noted above, 
the purpose of hate crime legislation was to enact tougher penalties to deter such 
behavior.  However, much of this is premised on juries perceiving hate crimes as more 
deplorable than normal crimes.  In the following chapter, the scant research on jury 
decision making in hate crime cases is discussed to ascertain whether jurors’ behavior is 
consistent with legislative intent.  
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Chapter Three 
Overview of Race and Jury Research 
Introduction to Race and Jury Research 
 While the current legal system assumes that jurors are supposed to focus only on 
the facts of the case, some research suggests that extralegal indicators – such as race, sex, 
and attractiveness of the defendant – are considered in jury decisions (Hymes et al., 1993; 
Mazzella & Feingold, 1994; Zebrowitz & McDonald, 1991).  Extralegal factors are 
defined as any characteristic that is taken into consideration by jurors that influence or 
bias the juror’s decision about adjudication or sentencing the defendant beyond the facts 
of the case (Reskin & Visher 1986; Lizotte, 1978; Hagan, 1974).  Although there are 
several extralegal factors documented that influence juror’s decision making, race is the 
most researched extralegal factor (Marcus-Newhall et al., 2002).  
Although the influence of race on jury decision making is an important area of 
inquiry, the knowledge garnered from the existing literature seems to have provided more 
questions than answers (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000).  Of the few studies conducted, 
most have yielded inconsistent results about juror’s perceptions of guilty verdicts and 
sentencing related to race.  For instance, some studies have found bias against 
defendants; specifically, African-Americans are more likely to be arrested, convicted, and 
receive harsher sentences (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000; Marcus-Newhall et al., 2002; 
Kemmelmeier, 2005).  Yet, it is important to consider not just the race of the defendant, 
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but also the juror.  Here, too, there is inconsistent evidence. While some studies have 
found juror biases against defendants of the same race, others have found no differences 
or inconsistent data (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000; Marcus-Newhall et al., 2002; 
Kemmelmeier, 2005).  In addition, researchers have found anti-White biases for high-
status crimes, like embezzlement, in which Caucasians are more likely to be found guilty.  
However, for low-status crimes like robbery and assault, anti-minority biases occur 
(Kemmelmeier, 2005).  Moreover, few studies consider the perceptions of African-
American jurors (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000).  This is important because research 
indicates that in-group bias might exist.  That is, African-American mock jurors may be 
more lenient towards African-American defendants than Caucasian mock jurors (Abshire 
& Bornstein, 2003).   
In-Group versus Out-Group Favoritism and Racial Salience in Jury Decision Making 
Several different theories and factors that influence jury decision making have 
been suggested.  Racial salience is a phenomenon that has been studied in the race and 
jury literature.  Studies have found that when Caucasian jurors are reminded of racial 
prejudice, they are more likely to pay attention to legally relevant information when the 
defendant is African-American.  Thus, Caucasian jurors are more likely to 
overcompensate because of the motivation to appear non-prejudicial (Sommers & 
Ellsworth, 2000; Sargent & Bradfield, 2004; Kemmelmeier, 2005).  However when race 
is less salient, racial prejudice is more often expressed (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000).  
For example, Sargent and Bradfield (2004) conducted two studies composed of all 
Caucasian participants recruited from public places, such as shopping malls and the 
airport.  In this study, participants read a case where either a Caucasian or African-
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American man was charged with armed robbery, and the alibi offered was either strong 
or weak.  There were two additional conditions presented in the study.  The first was 
where mock jurors were not motivated to pay attention to the details of the case by being 
informed that the study was a pilot study in preparation for future research and they 
would receive $5 for participation; this condition was named the ‘low motivation’ 
condition.  The second condition motivated mock jurors to pay attention to the case 
details, and was labeled the ‘high motivation’ condition (mock jurors were informed that 
case was a real case and the results of the study would impact future jury instruction; 
additionally mock jurors would only be compensated $5 if their responses were 
congruent with the outcome of the actual case).  The researchers found that when 
participants were highly motivated to pay attention to the trial details, race did not have 
any effect.  However, in the low motivation condition, race played an effect on the mock 
jurors’ likelihood of finding the defendant guilty based on the alibi presented (Sargent & 
Bradfield, 2004).  Specifically, the mock jurors were likely to find the defendant guilty if 
the defendant was African-American and had a weak alibi.   However, there was no 
effect for Caucasian defendants on alibi strength with guilt adjudication (Sargent & 
Bradfield, 2004).   
 In the second study conducted by Sargent and Bradfield (2004), the conditions 
were similar to the first study.  The only difference was that the alibi strength 
manipulation was replaced by the district attorney’s effectiveness of cross examination of 
the defense witness.  The results showed a three-way interaction effect such that in the 
low motivation condition where participants were sensitive to the cross-examination if 
the defendant was African-American.   There was no race effect found in the high 
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motivation condition related to cross-examination (Sargent & Bradfield, 2004).  In 
summary, the impact of legally relevant information was more important when the 
defendant was African-American and the motivation was low. 
 Another factor that influences jury decision making is the psychological 
phenomenon of in-group versus out-group favoritism.  In-group bias is defined as bias 
whereby members of a particular racial group tend to show favoritism for their own 
members of that particular racial group.  Out-group bias is described as preference 
towards non-members of that particular racial group (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000).  One 
may propose that the ‘Black Sheep Effect’ has occurred when out-group bias occurs.  The 
‘Black Sheep Effect’ is defined as “in-group targets are rated more negatively than out-
group targets when a target’s features are unambiguously negative” (Khan & Lambert, 
1998).  This theory has garnered some credibility in psychological research.  For 
instance, it has been found that people tend to be more punitive to in-group members 
when an in-group member commits a crime (Prooijen, 2006; Marcus-Newhall et al., 
2002).  It is considered a negative attribute when an individual commits a crime.  The 
more severe the crime, the more negative the crime is presumed.  In-group members are 
motivated to maintain a positive social status and avoid negativity.  Thus, when an in-
group member commits a crime, other in-group members tend to avoid any association 
with that particular in-group criminal.  Therefore, in-group members tend to be more 
punitive towards members of their own group who commit crimes in efforts to maintain a 
positive social status and disassociate with negativity.   
Conversely, other studies have shown that some people display ‘in-group’ 
favoritism to criminal suspects. Generally, the studies that found in-group favoritism 
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occurred in situations where the guilt of the defendant was disputable (Prooijen, 2006).  
While individuals may display in-group favoritism in certain situations, on the other 
hand, racial salience mitigates this; when racial issues are made salient, Caucasian mock 
jurors tend to show less favor to their in-group member.  Caucasian mock jurors were 
more likely to adjudicate the suspect guilty in racially salient conditions.  When the 
situation was vague, jurors tended to exhibit in-group favoritism (Marcus-Newhall et al., 
2002).  Other studies have found that jurors were more likely to find the in-group 
defendant guilty when the evidence was strong. However, they were likely to find the 
out-group defendant guilty when the evidence was weak (Prooijen, 2006).  Kemmelmeier 
(2005) found that individuals of an oppressed group generally presented leniency towards 
their own in-group members and showed harsher reactions to the out-group/racially 
dominant group.   
Another study was conducted to examine the in-group/out-group phenomenon. 
Prooijen (2006) conducted four experiments designed to examine in-group versus out-
group bias.  The results of one study indicated that participants displayed more retributive 
affect towards in-group members when guilt was certain and less retributive affect to out-
group members.  Participants were more likely to seek justice and be more punitive to in-
group members versus out-group members when guilt was certain.  However, they 
showed less retributive affect to in-group members when the guilt was uncertain and 
more retributive affect to out-group members when the guilt was uncertain.  While there 
was no guilt probability main effect found in the first experiment, a main effect was 
found in the second experiment; the researcher attributed this finding to the higher 
severity of the crime in the second experiment (Prooijen, 2006).  Based on the findings of 
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these two studies, it was concluded that guilt probability is a moderating factor of the 
influence of social classification on an individual’s punitive emotions, that is, their 
ratings of anger and hostility.    
Other studies have shown that there is in-group bias when that group has high 
status and power.  However, there tends to be out-group favoritism when that particular 
group is of lower status and power (Marcus-Newhall et al., 2002).  Sommers and 
Ellsworth (2000) conducted two studies aimed at elucidating these effects.  In the first 
study, they provided trial summaries and questions to college students; race was made 
salient in the trial summaries.  The study showed that African-American mock jurors 
were more likely to convict Caucasian defendants. Caucasian defendants did not show 
any preference for convicting either the African-American or Caucasian defendant.  This 
result is consistent with the idea that African-American jurors are less likely to convict 
their in-group members.  It is also congruent with the social dominance theory.  This 
theory assumes that individuals of a lower social class tend to distrust higher institutions, 
such as the judicial system as they suspect these higher entities of discriminating against 
minority groups (Kemmelmeier, 2005).   
On the other hand, the social dominance theory suggests that individuals in higher 
social classes are more likely to have faith in higher institutions, and as such perceive 
judicial systems are fair and just (Kemmelmeier, 2005).  Consequently, African-
Americans that already believe that justice institutions are unfair are less likely to convict 
their in-group member.  In a study of social dominance, Caucasian participants 
(undergraduates) in a mock-juror situation were presented with an assault case and the 
race of the defendant was manipulated.  The results indicated that individuals in the 
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social dominant group were likely to give guilty judgments and high sentence 
recommendations as they exhibited anti-black biases.  However, the individuals who 
were low in social dominance showed pro-Black biases (Kemmelmeier, 2005).   
In the second study, Sommers & Ellsworth (2000) recruited participants at an 
airport and randomly assigned individuals to one of four versions of the trial summary.  
Some of the conditions in the study were race-salient conditions, while other conditions 
were non-race salient.  In the race salient conditions, African-American mock jurors were 
more likely to exhibit same-race leniency, while Caucasian mock jurors appeared non-
prejudicial.  In the non-race salient condition, both African-American and Caucasian 
mock jurors demonstrated in-group favoritism where they found out-group members 
guilty and gave harsher sentences (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000). 
Race and Jury Decision Making Summary 
 Overall, researchers have identified race as an influential extralegal factor.  The 
research on race and jury decision making primarily focuses on racial salience, and how 
it affects in-group and out-group bias.  Prior research has also demonstrated that 
individuals exhibited in-group and out-group bias in certain circumstances.  Researchers 
found that in racially salient circumstances, Caucasian participants generally paid special 
attention to case details in attempts to appear non-prejudicial, while African-American 
mock jurors demonstrated in-group favoritism.  However, in non-race salient conditions, 
Caucasian and African-American mock jurors exhibited in-group bias.  Overall, African-
American mock jurors tended to exhibit in-group favoritism when the defendant was 
African-American in criminal cases despite racial salience.  These factors may be 
particularly important in hate crimes, which are inherently race salient.  However, very 
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little is known about the specific influence of hate crimes on mock juror decision making 
and what factors are related to jurors’ perceptions of hate crimes.  The following section 
describes the scant research in this area and highlights the need for additional research. 
Hate Crime and Jury Decision Making Research 
Hate crimes and jury decision making is an important area to study because hate 
crimes produce a very unique dynamic.  Although it is important to understand hate 
crime and jury decision making because hate crimes continue to occur, surprisingly there 
is very little research conducted in this area.  In fact, a literature search revealed only four 
studies on this topic.  This section will explore the results of the four existing research 
studies.  
Marcus-Newhall et al. (2002) conducted three separate studies involving hate 
crimes and jury decision making.  The study participants (all Caucasian college students) 
read a paragraph about a shooting that took place between two motorists; racial slurs 
were mentioned in this scenario.    In the first experiment, the researchers looked at the 
effect of the race of the victim (African-American, Caucasian), race of the perpetrator 
(African-American, Caucasian), and political orientation (self-identified conservative, 
liberal).  The study found that when the hate crime was committed by a Caucasian against 
an African-American victim, participants were more likely to give a guilty adjudication 
and a longer sentence than in the scenario in which an African-American committed a 
hate crime on a Caucasian victim (Marcus-Newhall et al., 2002).  In this experiment, 
Caucasians did not show in-group bias, suggesting that Caucasians no longer receive in-
group favoritism because of the misuse of the power they have in society by committing 
a hate crime (Marcus-Newhall et al., 2002).   
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In the second experiment, the researchers replicated and extended the findings 
from the first experiment by surveying individuals from a food court. This sample was 
presumed to be more similar to actual jurors than a sample of college students. Findings 
from this study indicated that when Caucasians committed a hate crime against an 
African-American victim, it was perceived as a more negative event, in comparison to a 
hate crime committed by an African-American perpetrator on a Caucasian victim 
(Marcus-Newhall et al., 2002).  Additionally, the researchers found that there was a 
higher certainty of guilt when the victim was African-American and the perpetrator was 
Caucasian.  However there was no significant effect on sentencing rating.   
In the third experiment, the researchers recruited 35 minority and 83 Caucasian 
participants.  The race of the perpetrator was held constant as Caucasian, while the race 
of the victim was manipulated.   Juror race was also examined to determine what 
influence it might exert on guilt outcomes.  The results showed that minority participants 
displayed in-group favoritism.  Specifically, minority mock jurors perceived the hate 
crime event more severe when the victim was African-American than when the victim 
was Caucasian (Marcus-Newhall et al., 2002).  Overall, race of the perpetrator and race 
of the victim differentially influenced mock jurors (Marcus-Newhall et al., 2002).  While 
prior research has demonstrated in-group favoritism in non-race salient conditions 
(Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000), hate crime research is congruent with racially salient 
findings, such that Caucasian mock jurors do not exhibit in-group favoritism (Sommers 
& Ellsworth, 2000; Marcus-Newhall et al., 2002).  Researchers have suggested that the 
out-group favoritism is connected to attempts to appear non-prejudicial (Sommers & 
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Ellsworth, 2000; Marcus-Newhall et al., 2002); this attempt is explained by the aversive 
racism theory (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1988). 
The aversive racism theory hypothesizes a sub-conscious effort by Caucasian 
Americans who hold prejudicial attitudes to maintain a non-prejudicial social image.  
Aversive racists believe that they are not prejudiced; however they have negative, racist 
beliefs and feelings that they may be unaware of, or that they try to disassociate from 
their social image.  The negative, racial beliefs generally stem from learned social biases 
that may have been influenced by media representations of minority groups.  Aversive 
racists will not show their prejudicial attitudes in public.  However, a display of prejudice 
may occur in situations where their actions can be justified by another cause other than 
race, such as negligence committed by a minority group member (Gaertner & Dovidio, 
1988). 
The second study on hate crimes was conducted by Gerstenfeld (2003).  In this 
study, the researcher recruited 190 voluntary participants, composed of both 
undergraduate students and non-student adults.  The participants were informed that the 
perpetrator had been charged with an assault felony, felony assault with a deadly weapon, 
and a hate crime.  He hypothesized that African-American defendants would be found 
guilty at a significantly higher rate and receive harsher sentences in comparison to 
Caucasian defendants.  This is consistent with the general research findings regarding 
punitive behavior toward African-American defendants (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000; 
Marcus-Newhall et al., 2002; Kemmelmeier, 2005).  However, this study found results 
similar to other studies in hate crimes and jury decision making research.  Specifically, 
jurors were more certain of Caucasian defendants’ guilt and convicted Caucasian 
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defendants more frequently of hate crimes.  However there was no difference in 
sentencing (Gerstenfeld, 2003).  Although the results were opposite to the researcher’s 
hypothesis, the results were congruent with hate crime research in jury decision making.  
The researcher initially attributed his hypothesis to stereotypes about African-Americans.  
This stereotype generally suggests that African-Americans are found guilty more 
frequently and receive harsher sentences than Caucasians.  However, statistics show that 
African-Americans are more frequently victims of hate crimes, and Caucasians are 
generally the perpetrators of hate crimes (Green et al., 1998; Saucier et al., 2006; Nolan 
et al., 2002; Jacobs & Potter, 1997).  Thus, the stereotype for hate crimes (African-
American victims and Caucasian perpetrators) is different from general stereotypes about 
African-American criminal behavior.   
The third hate crime study (Saucier et al., 2006) sought to examine the mock juror 
(i.e., college students) beliefs about hate crimes sentencing compared to non-hate crimes.  
The participants read an assault crime scenario where the defendant insulted the victim 
with racial slurs.  The results of this study showed that the participants were more likely 
to give more severe sentences when the victim was an African-American male, Jewish 
male, Latino male, Asian male, or gay male than if the victim was a Caucasian female or 
a Caucasian male in the simple assault conditions.  They also found that participants were 
likely to classify the assault as a hate crime when it was against a minority group member 
than when it was against Caucasians.  Additionally, the participants believed that the hate 
crimes were more severe than other crimes (Saucier et al., 2006).  Notably, however, the 
authors did not explicitly label the crime depicted in the scenario as a hate crime. This is 
important because using the term, hate crime, ensures participants’ awareness of the 
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presence of the hate crime; this avoids potential misinterpretations between racially 
manipulated scenarios and actual hate crime conditions. 
In the fourth hate crime study, Craig et al., (1999) examined 24 African-American 
and 49 Caucasian male participants observing video-taped assaults, across two 
conditions.  In one condition the perpetrator and the victim were the same race.  In the 
second condition, the race was varied where the assailant was Caucasian and the victim 
was African-American, and vice versa.  In this condition, the perpetrator and the victim 
exchanged racially provocative remarks.  The second condition was classified as the hate 
crime condition in this study.  The results of this study showed that African-American 
participants rated the hate crime event as more typical and likely to occur in comparison 
to the Caucasian participants.  Additionally, African-American participants indicated that 
they were more likely to retaliate and express desire for revenge if put in a similar 
situation (Craig, 1999).   
All four studies are congruent with history and statistics that show that African-
Americans tend to be victims of hate crimes more frequently than Caucasians (Craig, 
1999; Marcus-Newhall et al., 2002; Gerstenfeld, 2003; Saucier et al., 2006; Jacobs & 
Potter, 1997; Saucier et al., 2006; Green et al., 1998; Nolan et al., 2002; Torres, 1999).  
Stereotypic notions of what a hate crime is, is influenced by the perpetrator and victims’ 
races.  While the studies presented in this section provide an opening to research in this 
area, the studies have identified flaws that need to be addressed for future research.  The 
following section explores the flaws found in these studies. 
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Flaws in Existing Hate Crime and Jury Decision Making Research 
The design in the Craig et al. (1999) study was flawed.  First, all participants 
watched the video scenes where the assault occurred either on the same race or different 
race victim.  This design is flawed because it inhibits the participants’ ability to 
independently evaluate each scene since they have been exposed to both crime scenarios.  
Juror perceptions of the race manipulated condition are influenced by the observation of 
the non-race condition.  Ideally, participants should be randomly assigned to different 
assault conditions, one group of participants having observed only the non-race 
condition, and another group of participants having observed the race manipulated 
condition.  
Other hate crime researchers (Marcus-Newhall et al. 2002; Gerstenfeld 2003; 
Saucier et al., 2006) presented a racially varied assault condition and labeled it as a hate 
crime; however, the term hate crime for this condition is not actually used.  Only Craig et 
al. (1999) actually used the term hate crime in their study.  As opposed to simply 
manipulating the race in an assault condition, the use of the term hate crime and 
providing sentencing guidelines for hate crimes may significantly alter the results of a 
study.  This is because labeling the crime as a hate crime increases racial salience.   
Moreover, one of the very important concerns is that while all of the studies 
manipulated race, none of the studies took into consideration that other factors, other than 
race, may have influenced adjudication and sentencing outcomes.  For instance, 
perceptions of aggressiveness are known to influence sentencing and adjudication 
(Hurwitz & Peffley, 1997; Quillian & Pager, 2001; Peffley et al., 1997).  However none 
of the studies demonstrated that any potentially influential factors were controlled for. 
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Marcus-Newhall et al. (2002) manipulated the race of the victim, the race of the 
perpetrator, and the role of peer group (peer influence – encouraging discouraging), 
however there was no attempt to control for any confounding factors.  Gerstenfeld (2003) 
manipulated the offender's race, the victim's race, and the participant’s level of racism, 
however other covarying factors were not considered.  In the Saucier (2006) article, the 
researchers manipulated severity of crime, and the target's group membership; however 
potential influential factors were not discussed.  And finally Craig et al. (1999) 
manipulated race of the perpetrator; the victim was always the same race as the 
participant’s race; however other factors that may impact the outcomes were not included 
in the study. 
Jury Decision Making in the Context of Hate Crimes Summary 
 In summary, to my knowledge, only four hate crime and jury decision making 
studies have been conducted.  Research in this area is particularly interesting as it reveals 
an in-group/out-group dynamic.  The results of hate crime studies show that since the 
hate crime condition is a racially salient condition, Caucasian mock jurors tend to find 
Caucasian defendants guilty and impose harsher sentences when the victim is African-
American; Caucasian defendants show out-group favoritism while African-American 
mock jurors demonstrate in-group favoritism.  The hate crime studies, as well as the 
statistics provided show congruency with the stereotypes, such that Caucasians tend to be 
perpetrators of hate crimes and African-Americans tend to be the victims.   
Of the studies examined, all studies have identified flaws.  Of significance, while 
prior studies have found significant results, none of the studies have examined to what 
extent legally relevant and legally irrelevant factors exert influence on mock juror’s 
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decision making on adjudication and sentencing recommendations.  Additionally, in 
some of the study designs, participants were exposed to all conditions.  Three of the four 
conditions did not use the term hate crime.  The current study seeks to address all the 
flaws indicated.  The following chapter will describe the methods used to conduct the 
study.  The chapters after the methods include the results, discussion, and conclusion. 
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Chapter Four 
Methods 
Participants 
 Participants were recruited from undergraduate criminology classes at a large, 
state university in Florida.  Participants were informed that the study was confidential and 
their participation was voluntary.  Because the courses serve a wide variety of 
undergraduate students, the sample was reasonably representative of the student body of 
the university. Although there are some differences between undergraduate samples and 
non-college samples generally (Sears, 1986), such samples have been found to be 
acceptable in jury decision making research.  For instance, after a 20 year review of jury 
simulation studies, Bornstein (1999) noted that not only are the majority of studies based 
on college samples, but that there are few substantive differences between college and 
community samples. Thus, the current sample is acceptable and consistent with previous 
studies on jury decision making.  
Procedure 
Researchers have noted that numerous studies use the experimental approach by 
providing mock jurors a trial summary and questionnaires (Sommers & Adekanmbi, 
2008, Bornstein, 1999).  Sommers & Adekanmbi (2008) indicated that the experimental 
approach is frequently used as it increases internal validity by controlling for many 
factors that could potentially influence mock jurors.  Using the experimental approach 
 37 
allows researchers to hold all other factors constant and focus on the variables they are 
attempting to manipulate (Sommers & Adekanmbi, 2008).  As such, in the current study, 
participants were informed that they would participate in a study on legal opinions.  
Specifically, they were asked to read a hypothetical court transcript and answer a series 
of questions about how they decided in the case, as well as their opinions of the 
defendant, victim, and witnesses who testified.  As noted below, there were four different 
versions of the trial.  These different scenarios were randomly distributed to participants 
during a regular class session.  Participants were asked to return the completed 
questionnaire within one week.  The trial scenario and questionnaire took approximately 
20 minutes to complete.  Students were given extra credit in the course for completing the 
protocol.  Students who opted not to participate in the research, but wanted extra credit 
were provided with an alternative way of earning extra credit. 
Study Materials 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions.  In all conditions, 
participants were provided with the basic facts of the case, which were supplemented 
with an abbreviated court transcript.  In every scenario, the offenses (aggravated battery 
and robbery) and the facts of the case were the same.  What varied across the scenarios 
was the inclusion of racially salient material.  The race of the offenders and victims were 
also varied all study conditions.  The first and second conditions were the racially salient 
hate crime conditions.  The third and fourth conditions were non-hate crime conditions.  
In the first and third condition, the victim was African-American and the perpetrator was 
Caucasian.  In the second and fourth condition, victim was Caucasian and the perpetrator 
was African-American.  The first two conditions were termed the hate crime conditions 
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as they were explicitly defined as hate crimes.  In addition, these initial two conditions 
contained testimony that the offender used racial slurs.  The third and fourth condition 
did not include testimony that the perpetrator used racial slurs; only the race of the victim 
and perpetrator were varied.  Therefore, the third and fourth conditions were named the 
non-hate crime conditions.  After reading the trial scenario, participants answered several 
questions (see next section, Measures of Dependant Variables). 
Measures of Independent and Dependent Variables 
Verdicts.  Jurors were asked to render separate verdicts (for aggravated battery 
and robbery) in this hypothetical case. Specifically, they chose between the options of “1 
= Guilty” and “2 = Not Guilty.” In addition, they were asked to indicate the likelihood 
that the defendant committed the crimes; responses ranged from 1 (“not at all likely”) to 
10 (“the defendant definitely committed the crime”).  Participants were asked the second 
question to establish variability in responses with respect to adjudication. 
Punishment Severity.  Jurors were asked to recommend a sentence for aggravated 
battery and robbery.  Jurors were asked to rate how much punishment the defendant 
deserved on a scale of 1 (no punishment) to 10 (maximum punishment).  Participants 
were also asked to recommend a sentence, from no sentence to 13 – 15 years for the non-
hate crime conditions or no sentence to 28 – 30 years for the hate crime conditions.  
While jurors in actual cases do not determine sentencing, I was interested in investigating 
whether participants would respond in accordance with sentencing guidelines and hate 
crime laws. 
Perceptions of Trial Participants. In all conditions, jurors responded to questions 
asking how aggressive they believed the defendant was on a scale of 1 (not aggressive at 
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all) to 10 (very aggressive).  They rated how likely they believed the defendant would 
commit a crime in the future on a scale of 1 (not likely) to 10 (very likely).  Correlational 
analyses were computed to examine inter-relationships between the two above mentioned 
variables.  Results indicated that the defendant’s perceived aggressiveness and likelihood 
for future criminal activity were strongly, significantly, and positively correlated (r = 0.8, 
p < .01).  As such, a dangerousness variable was created by combining the raw scores of 
the defendant’s perceived aggressiveness and likelihood of future criminal activity.  
Additionally, jurors rated the credibility of the witnesses (victim and police) in the trial 
on a scale of 1 (not believable at all) to 10 (very believable).  And finally, mock jurors 
rated how attractive they believed the defendant and the victim were on a scale of 1 (not 
attractive) to 10 (very attractive).  Mock jurors were asked about their perceptions on 
dangerousness, witness credibility, and attractiveness because prior research has 
suggested that the above mentioned perceptions exert influence on mock juror’s decisions 
on adjudication and sentencing (Marcus-Newhall et al., 2002; Hymes et al., 1993; 
Mazzella & Feingold, 1994; Reskin & Visher 1986; Lizotte, 1978; Hagan, 1974).  
Although these factors influence juror decision making, some factors are expected to 
exert influence (legally relevant variables), while others are not (legally irrelevant 
variables).  Specifically, witness credibility is a legally relevant factor for guilt 
adjudication; it is a legally irrelevant factor for sentencing (775.085, Florida Statutes, 
Supp. 1998).  Dangerousness is a legally relevant factor for sentence recommendations 
and deserved punishment; it is a legally irrelevant factor for guilt adjudication (775.085, 
Florida Statutes, Supp. 1998).   Attractiveness, however, is a legally irrelevant factor for 
all outcomes (Zebrowitz & McDonald, 1991).  Mock jurors were asked about the above 
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mentioned factors as they may be potential covariates that influence adjudication, 
deserved punishment, and sentencing outcomes.  The aim of this study was to examine 
the true independent effects of offender-victim racial composition and type of crime 
manipulations, by controlling for these covarying factors.   
Perceptions of Racially Motivating Factors. In the first two conditions that were 
labeled hate crime conditions, mock jurors were asked whether they believed the crime 
committed was a hate crime; mock jurors answered yes if they believed it was a hate 
crime and no if they did not believe it was a hate crime.  Furthermore, in the hate crime 
and non-hate crime conditions, mock jurors were asked whether they believed the victim 
was a target because of his race on a scale of 1 (not likely) to 10 (very likely) and 
whether the defendant was prejudicial on the same scale.  Correlational analyses were 
computed to examine inter-relationships between these latter 2 variables.  The results 
demonstrated a strong, significant and positive correlation between the defendant’s 
prejudice and whether the victim was targeted because of race (r = 0.6, p < .01).  
Therefore, a hate motivation variable was created by combining the raw scores of two 
variables indicated above.  Similar to the covariates (dangerousness, witness credibility, 
and attractiveness) previously indicated, hate motivation was examined as a potential 
covarying factor, as it is known to influence adjudication and sentencing outcomes (Craig 
et al., 1999; Saucier et al., 2006; Gerstenfeld, 2003; Marcus-Newhall et al., 2002). 
Additionally, with respect to legal relevance in criminal cases, hate motivation is a 
legally relevant factor for hate crime adjudication and sentencing and a legally irrelevant 
factor for crime adjudication and non-hate crimes (775.085, Florida Statutes, Supp. 
1998).     
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Juror Characteristics. Jurors answered questions regarding demographic 
characteristics.  Specifically, jurors responded to questions about age, sex, race, and 
ethnicity.  The purpose of obtaining demographic information was to garner information 
on the mock juror characteristics for the sample acquired for this study.    
Hypothesis 
This section outlines the hypotheses for the hate crime conditions for both 
aggravated battery and robbery, as well as hypotheses focusing on the interracial 
dynamics of the offender and victim dyads.   
Hypothesis 1: Based on previous research that has focused on the influence 
of racial salience, there will be differences in adjudications across the experimental 
conditions: 
1a). Chi-square analyses will indicate that the distribution of guilt adjudication for 
aggravated assault and robbery will significantly vary across experimental conditions; 
1b). Chi-square analyses will indicate that the distribution of hate adjudication 
will significantly vary across experimental conditions; 
Hypothesis 2: Several covariates will be included in the multivariate models 
to examine their influence on guilt adjudication, deserved punishment, and sentence 
recommendations.  Additionally, the covariates will be included in the multivariate 
model to examine whether the experimental manipulations persist after controlling 
for offender dangerousness, witness credibility, and hate motivation. The following 
hypotheses are offered regarding those covariates: 
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2a). Perceptions of witness credibility (victim and police) will be significantly 
related to ratings of the likelihood that the defendant committed both crimes (aggravated 
battery and robbery); 
2b). Perceptions of offender dangerousness will be significantly related to 
sentence recommendations and deserved punishment for aggravated battery and robbery; 
2c). Perceptions of hate motivation will be significantly related to deserved 
punishment and sentence recommendations for aggravated battery and robbery; 
Although previous research has suggested that hate crimes are viewed differently 
than non-hate crimes, the extant literature has not examined the influence of offender-
victim racial composition and the effect of labeling crimes as hate crimes. In this study, 
the offender–victim dyad was expected to interact with the effect of labeling the crimes 
as hate crimes even after controlling for offender dangerousness, witness credibility, and 
hate motivation. As such, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
Hypothesis 3: There will be no main effect observed for type of crime (hate 
versus non-hate) on ratings of the likelihood the defendant committed aggravated 
battery and robbery, deserved punishment, and sentence recommendations. 
Hypothesis 4: There will be no main effect observed for offender-victim 
racial composition (Caucasian offender/African-American victim versus African-
American offender/Caucasian victim) on ratings of the likelihood the defendant 
committed aggravated battery and robbery, deserved punishment, and sentence 
recommendations. 
Hypothesis 5: There will be an interaction between type of crime (hate versus 
non-hate) and offender-victim racial composition (Caucasian offender/African-
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American victim versus African-American offender/Caucasian victim) on ratings of 
the likelihood the defendant committed aggravated battery and robbery, deserved 
punishment, and sentence recommendations after controlling for offender 
dangerousness, witness credibility, and hate motivation: 
5a). For those conditions labeled as hate crimes, there will be significantly higher 
means on (1) the likelihood that the defendant committed the crimes, (2) the deserved 
punishment, and (3) the recommended sentence when the victim is African-American and 
the defendant is Caucasian after controlling for offender dangerousness, witness 
credibility, and hate motivation [compared to when the victim is Caucasian and the 
defendant is African-American]; 
5b). For those conditions that are not labeled as hate crimes, there will be 
significantly higher means on (1) the likelihood that the defendant committed aggravated 
battery and robbery, (2) the deserved punishment, and (3) the recommended sentence 
when the victim is Caucasian and the defendant is African-American after controlling for 
offender dangerousness, witness credibility, and hate motivation [compared to when the 
victim is African-American and the defendant is Caucasian]; 
Design and Statistical Analysis 
 I computed descriptive statistics to obtain information on the mock juror 
characteristics for the sample acquired.  Correlations were conducted to establish 
relationships among variables.  Chi-square analyses were also computed to examine 
categorical data for guilt adjudication for aggravated battery and robbery, and perceptions 
of hate crimes.  I conducted a 2 x 2 Factorial Multivariate Analysis of Variance 
(MANOVA) to examine main effects for type of crime (hate versus non-hate), offender-
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victim racial composition (Caucasian/African-American), and the interaction between 
these two variables on ratings of likelihood the defendant committed aggravated battery 
and robbery, deserved punishment, and sentencing.  I then examined the same fixed 
factors and outcome variables after controlling for perceived racial motivation, 
dangerousness, and witness credibility.  Because covariates were included in this final 
series of analyses, a 2 x 2 Factorial Multivariate Analysis of Covariance (MANCOVA) 
was used.   
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Chapter Five 
Results 
 In the current study there were 90 participants.  All participants were 
undergraduate college students enrolled in criminology courses.  There were 60 (66.7%) 
Caucasian participants, 12 (13.3%) African-American participants, 16 (17.7%) other 
participants (Asian, American-Indian or Alaska Native, and Native Hawaiian or Other 
Pacific Islander), and 2 (2.2%) participants missing race information.  Twenty (22.2%) 
participants identified themselves as Latino/Hispanic, and 70 (77.8%) participants who 
did not identify themselves as Latino/Hispanic.  There were 43 (47.8%) female and 47 
(52.2%) male participants.  The ages of the participants ranged from 19 years old to 50 
years old.  The average age was 23 years old.   
First, bivariate correlations were computed to explore the relationships among the 
study variables.  Of particular interest were the relationships between dangerousness, hate 
motivation, witness credibility (police and victim), and attractiveness, with likelihood for 
guilt adjudication, deserved punishment, and sentencing.  Cohen’s (1992) standards were 
used to determine small, medium, and large effect sizes for this study.  
The results showed that for aggravated battery, there was a significant, strong, and 
positive relationship between the outcome variable of likelihood of guilt adjudication and 
dangerousness (r = 0.761, p < .01) and police credibility (r = 0.576, p < .01), a moderate 
relationship with victim credibility (r = 0.409, p < .01), and a small relationship with hate 
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motivation (r = 0.281, p < .01).  Additionally, for robbery, there was a significant, strong, 
and positive relationship between likelihood of guilt adjudication and perceived 
dangerousness (r = 0.693, p < .01), moderate relationships with witness credibility with 
both victim (r = 0.342, p < .01) and police (r = 0.438, p < .01), and a small correlation 
with hate motivation (r = 0.221, p < .05).  Attractiveness was not significantly related to 
likelihood of guilt adjudication for aggravated battery and robbery. 
Regarding the outcome variable of deserved punishment, the results showed a 
significant, strong, and positive relationship between deserved punishment and perceived 
dangerousness (r = 0.622, p < .01), and moderate relationships with hate motivation (r = 
0.493, p < .01) and witness credibility with both the police (r = 0.540, p < .01) and the 
victim (r = 0.409, p < .01) for aggravated battery.  There were significant, positive, and 
moderate relationships observed between deserved punishment and perceived 
dangerousness (r = 0.480, p < .01), and police credibility (r = 0.335, p < .01), and small 
relationships with victim credibility (r = 0.199, p < .05) and hate motivation (r = 0.292, p 
< .01) for robbery.  Attractiveness was not significantly correlated with deserved 
punishment for aggravated battery and robbery.   
Finally, in reference to the outcome variable for sentencing, the results indicated 
that there was a significant, strong, and positive relationship between sentencing and 
perceived dangerousness (r = 0.565, p < .01) and a moderate relationship with hate 
motivation (r = 0.449, p < .01).  Additionally, there was a significant, moderate, and 
positive relationship between sentencing and witness credibility for both police (r = 
0.510, p < .01) and victim (r = 0.364, p < .01) for aggravated battery.  The results also 
showed that there were significant, moderate, and positive relationships between 
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sentencing and perceived dangerousness (r = 0.581, p < .01), hate motivation (r = 0.387, 
p < .01), and witness credibility for the police (r = 0.416, p < .01), and a small 
relationship with witness credibility for the victim (r = 0.261, p < .01) for robbery.  
Attractiveness was not significantly related to sentencing for aggravated battery and 
robbery.   
 In summary, dangerousness, hate motivation, and witness credibility (police and 
victim) were significantly related to likelihood of guilt adjudication, deserved 
punishment, and sentencing.  However attractiveness was not significantly correlated 
with any of the outcome variables (see Table 1).  Therefore, the bivariate findings 
indicate that factors, such as dangerousness, witness credibility, and hate motivation need 
to be controlled for in the multivariate analyses in order to evaluate the whether or not the 
manipulations related to (1) labeling the crime as a hate crime and (2) varying the victim-
offender races exerted any independent influence.  Attractiveness was not included in the 
multivariate analyses as a covariate as it was not related to likelihood of guilt 
adjudication, deserved punishment, and sentencing. 
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Table 1 
 
Correlations Between Adjudication and Punishment Variables with Aggressiveness, 
Likelihood of Future Crime, and Prejudice for the Hate Crime Study 
 
 Prison  Punishment Prison  Punishment Likely  Likely  
            Battery  Battery Robbery Robbery Battery          Robbery 
         
 
Danger.565**  .622**  .480**  .581**  .761**  .693** 
  
 
Race .449**  .493**  .292**  .387**  .281**  .221* 
Motivation  
 
 
Police .510**  .540**  .335**  .416**  .576**  .438** 
Credibility  
  
  
Victim .364**  .409**  .199*  .261**  .409**  .342**  
Credibility 
 
Def.  .003  .134  -.061  .087  .094  .031 
Attractiveness 
 
Victim .088  .134  .007  .160  .140  .120  
Attractiveness 
n = 90 
**p < .01 
  *p < .05  
Following correlational analyses, I conducted chi-square analyses to test whether 
there were differences across experimental conditions for 1. guilt adjudication and 2. hate 
adjudication.  The first chi-square analysis examined whether the guilty verdicts (guilty 
vs. not guilty) varied by condition for the aggravated assault and robbery.  The first 
hypothesis suggested that there would be observed differences in adjudication across the 
experimental conditions.  The chi-square was statistically significant, therefore 
suggesting that there were significant differences across the cells that did not occur by 
 49 
chance for aggravated battery (χ2 (3, n = 89) = 11.795, p < .05).  However, the chi-square 
for robbery was not statistically significant (χ2 (3, n = 90) = 6.458, p > .05), thus there 
were no differences across the cells; therefore hypothesis 1a. was supported for 
aggravated battery only.  Although chi-square analyses cannot indicate precisely which 
cells differ from one another, an examination of the percentages in each cell does provide 
some insight into where the greatest differences lie.  Thirty-one percent of mock jurors 
found the African-American defendant (Caucasian victim) guilty for aggravated battery, 
in comparison to 17.8% of mock jurors who found the Caucasian defendant (African-
American victim) guilty for aggravated battery when comparing the two hate crime 
conditions.  When comparing the non-hate crime conditions, 11.1% of mock jurors found 
the African-American defendant (Caucasian victim) guilty for aggravated battery 
compared to 40.0% of mock jurors who found the Caucasian defendant (African-
American victim) guilty for aggravated battery.  Please see table 2 for details.  It is 
important to note that these analyses did not include covariates. Thus, it remains unclear 
whether these differences were due to the experimental manipulations or some other 
factors. (This more detailed analysis will be the focus of the MANCOVAs that follow.) 
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Table 2 
 
Chi-Square Analysis for Guilty Verdicts for Assault and Robbery – the Observed Counts 
vs. Expected Counts 
    Aggravated Battery   Robbery 
Condition       Guilty  Not Guilty  Guilty  Not 
Guilty 
         
1. Hate – BV/WD  Count 8   9  8  9 
    % within Decision  17.8%   20.5%  19.5%  18.4% 
 
2. Hate – WV/BD  Count  14   12  14  11  
    % within Decision  31.1%   25.0%  34.1%  24.5% 
 
3. Non-Hate – BV/WD Count 14   11  18  7  
    % within Decision  40.0%   15.9%  34.1%  22.4% 
 
4. Non-Hate – WV/BD Count 5   17  5  17 
     % within Decision  11.1%   38.6%  12.2% 
 34.73% 
 
Total    45   44  41  49 
% Total within Decision 100.0%  100.0% 100.0%
 100.0% 
n = 90 
The third chi-square test examined whether participants viewed the two hate 
conditions as actual hate crimes.  Since the first two conditions were described as hate 
crimes (the remaining two conditions did not contain explicit suggestion that the crimes 
were classified as hate crimes), only these two conditions were included in this analysis.  
The results showed that the chi-square value was statistically significant, indicating that 
the distribution for hate adjudication significantly varied across experimental hate crime 
conditions (χ2 (1, n = 42) = 4.061, p < .05); therefore hypothesis 1b. was supported.  The 
analysis revealed that the 51.9% of mock jurors believed the crime was a hate crime 
when the victim was African-American and the defendant was Caucasian, in comparison 
to 20.0% who did not.  However, when the victim was Caucasian and the defendant was 
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African-American, 48.1% of mock jurors believed the crime was a hate crime in 
comparison to 80.0% who did not.  This pattern of results suggests that the most notable 
differences were in regards to when the defendant was Caucasian and the victim was 
African-American.  Further, the distribution of guilty verdicts suggests that when the 
victim is African-American and the offender is Caucasian, mock jurors are inclined to 
view this as more representative of a hate crime than when the offender is African-
American and the victim is Caucasian. Please see table 3 for a review of the hate crime 
verdicts.   
Table 3 
 
Chi-Square Analysis for Hate Crime Verdicts – the Observed Counts vs. Expected Counts 
      
Condition         Yes    No  
       
1. Hate – BV/WD Count   14    3  
  
    % within Decision    51.9%    20.0% 
 
2. Hate – WV/BD Count    13    12 
% within Decision    48.1%    80.0% 
 
Total      27    15 
% within Decision    100.0%   100.0% 
n = 42 
Upon completion of the chi-square analyses, the multivariate analyses were 
computed.  The goal was to asses whether type of crime (hate versus non-hate), offender-
victim racial composition (Caucasian/African-American), or the interaction between 
these two variables influenced determinations of (1) likelihood of guilt adjudication, (2) 
recommended sentence, and (3) punishment recommendations.  These analyses were 
separated by crime (aggravated battery and robbery) and conducted in two stages.  The 
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first stage used type of crime and offender-victim racial composition as the fixed factors 
and examined whether these factors or the interaction between them influenced the above 
mentioned outcomes before controlling for dangerousness, witness credibility, and hate 
motivation.  As such, the first series of analyses employed a 2 x 2 Factorial Multivariate 
Analyses of Variance (MANOVAs), which is a test used to assess the exerted influence 
of two fixed factors and their interaction on ratings of multiple (more than one) 
dependent variables (outcomes).  The second stage assessed the influence of type of 
crime and offender-victim racial composition on guilt adjudication, deserved punishment, 
and sentence recommendations after controlling for offender dangerousness, witness 
credibility, and hate motivation.  The second stage used of 2 x 2 Factorial Multivariate 
Analyses of Covariance (MANCOVAs), which is a statistical analyses employed to 
examine the influence two fixed factors and their interaction exert on outcome variables 
after controlling for variables that have potential influence on the outcomes.  The 
objective for employing such a statistical technique was to assess whether the 
experimental manipulations still exert influence on the outcomes after controlling certain 
influential variables. Additionally the MANCOVAs were also conducted to examine 
whether the covariates exerted any influence on the outcomes.   
The first 2 x 2 Factorial MANOVA focused on whether there would be main 
effects observed for type of crime (hate versus non-hate), offender-victim racial 
composition (Caucasian/African-American), and the interaction between these variables 
on ratings of likelihood the defendant committed aggravated battery and deserved 
punishment.  The objective was to examine the effects of the experimental manipulations 
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on the outcome variables before controlling for potential covarying factors (see Table 4 
for descriptive statistics). 
Table 4 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Hate Crime Study Examining Type of Crime, Victim-Offender 
Racial Composition, and Interaction Effects on Ratings of Likelihood of Guilt 
Adjudication and Deserved Punishment for Aggravated Battery. 
   Hate Crime Race  Mean  SD   N 
   Condition       
Likelihood for  Yes  BV/WD 6.19  2.04  16  
Aggravated Battery Yes  WV/BD 7.46  1.96  26 
 
   No  BV/WD 7.12  2.13  25 
   No  WV/BD 5.19  2.89  21 
     
Deserved Punishment Yes  BV/WD 4.94  3.15  16 
Aggravated Battery Yes  WV/BD 4.93  3.24  26 
 
   No  BV/WD 5.32  3.11  25 
   No  WV/BD 2.90  2.23  21  
n = 83 
The multivariate results showed that there were no significant main effects 
observed for type of crime (multivariate F (2, 83) = 1.059, p > .05) or offender-victim 
racial composition (multivariate F (2, 83) = 1.921, p > .05).  However, the interaction 
was significant (multivariate F (2, 82) = 5.205, p = .007).  The multivariate F statistic 
indicates whether the independent variables have any influence on any the outcomes. In a 
MANOVA, there are multiple dependent variables.  However, to further examine the 
influence of the independent variable on each specific dependent variable in the model, 
one must examine the between-subjects effects.  In this first 2 x 2 Factorial MANOVA, 
the test for between-subjects effects showed that the interaction effect was significantly 
related to ratings of guilt likelihood for aggravated battery (F (1, 84) = 10.514, p = .002).  
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The R2 value was .11, which indicated that the interaction between type of crime and 
offender-victim racial composition explained 11% of the variance for guilt likelihood for 
aggravated battery.  With respect to deserved punishment, the interaction was only 
marginally significant (F (1, 84) = 3.441, p = .067).  The R2 value was .04, which 
indicated that the interaction between type of crime and offender-victim racial 
composition explained 4% of the variance for guilt likelihood for aggravated battery.  See 
table 5 for details.   
Table 5  
 
2 x 2 Factorial MANOVA Summary Table for Hate Crime Study Examining Type of 
Crime, Victim-Offender Racial Composition, and Interaction Effects on Ratings of 
Likelihood of Guilt Adjudication and Deserved Punishment for Aggravated Battery. 
 
Fixed Factor DV  SS  df MS  F  R2 
Type of Crime Likelihood for 9.501  1 9.501  1.836  .02 
  Battery 
  Deserved 14.190  1 14.190  1.598  .02 
  Punishment 
 
O-V   Likelihood 2.278  1 2.278  .440  .01 
Race Comp. Battery 
  Deserved 31.304  1 31.304  3.525  .04 
  Punishment 
 
Crime*Race Likelihood 54.421  1 54.421  10.514* .11 
  Battery 
  Deserved 30.565  1 30.565  3.441a  .04 
  Punishment 
n = 43 
*p < .05 
a marginal significance approaching .05 significance level 
As shown in the estimated marginal means (see Figure 1), the interaction was not 
consistent with the expected direction as suggested in prior research. Specifically, in the 
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hate crime condition, the mean likelihood that the defendant committed the crime was 
higher when the offender was African-American and the victim was Caucasian, 
compared to when the offender was Caucasian and the victim was African-American.  As 
noted in the hypotheses, it was expected that there would be higher means for likelihood 
that the defendant committed the crime when the victim was African American. In the 
non-hate crime condition, the mean likelihood that the defendant committed aggravated 
battery was higher when the offender was Caucasian and the victim was African-
American, compared to when the offender was African-American and the victim was 
Caucasian. Again, the hypothesis stated that when the crime was not labeled as a hate 
crime, higher means would be observed when the victim was white.  
The same series of analyses were conducted when examining the outcome of 
sentence recommendations. Specifically, a 2 x 2 Factorial ANOVA was computed to 
examine whether there were main effects observed for type of crime (hate versus non-
hate), offender-victim racial composition (Caucasian/African-American), and the 
interaction between these variables on ratings of sentence recommendations for 
aggravated battery.  The purpose of computing this analysis separately was to examine 
the recommended sentence only for those mock jurors that had found the defendant guilty 
for aggravated battery (n = 41).   
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Figure 1. Estimated Marginal Means of Likelihood that the Defendant Committed 
Aggravated Battery 
 
 The results demonstrated non-significant findings for main effects of type of 
crime (F (1, 41) = 2.676, p = .110) and offender-victim racial composition (F (1, 41) = 
0.663, p = .420), and the interaction between these two variables (F (1, 41) = 0.340, p = 
.563) on ratings of recommended sentence for aggravated battery; this finding did not 
support prior studies and hypothesis 5. See table 6 for details. 
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Table 6  
2 x 2 Factorial ANOVA Summary Table for Hate Crime Study Examining Type of Crime, 
Victim-Offender Racial Composition, and Interaction Effects on Ratings of Sentencing 
Recommendations for Aggravated Battery. 
 
Fixed Factor  DV  SS df MS  F  R2 
Type of Crime Years in Prison 6.927 1 6.927  2.676  .06 
  For Battery  
 
O-V  Years in Prison 1.715 1 1.715  .663  .02 
Race Comp. For Battery 
 
Crime*Race Years in Prison .880 1 .880  .340  .01 
  For Battery 
n = 41 
*p < .05 
 
The analyses examined thus far have asked and answered questions similar to 
previous studies in hate crime and jury decision making research.  However, those studies 
did not control for factors such as dangerousness, hate motivation, and witness credibility 
that may have impacted mock juror’s decision making on guilt adjudication, deserved 
punishment, and sentencing.  Thus, any significant findings may have been a function of 
the covarying factors indicated above, as opposed to the independent effects of offender-
victim racial composition or labeling a crime as a hate crime.   
The following MANCOVA was computed to determine whether there were main 
effects observed for type of crime (hate versus non-hate), offender-victim racial 
composition (Caucasian/African-American), and the interaction between these variables 
on ratings of likelihood the defendant committed aggravated battery and deserved 
punishment after controlling for perceptions of offender dangerousness, hate motivation, 
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and witness credibility (victim and police).  The purpose of conducting this analysis was 
to determine whether the offender-victim race manipulation, or the hate crime 
manipulation, or a combination of both were truly impacting likelihood of guilt and 
recommended punishment after controlling for the above mentioned variables.  
Additionally, the analyses would examine whether dangerousness, hate motivation, and 
witness credibility would exert a significant influence on the dependent variables.  The 
second hypothesis indicated that witness credibility would impact guilt likelihood, while 
dangerousness and hate motivation would impact deserved punishment. The third and 
forth hypothesis suggested that there would be no main effects observed for type of crime 
and offender-victim racial composition on ratings of guilt likelihood, deserved 
punishment, and sentencing recommendations.  However the fifth hypothesis suggested 
that there would be an interaction between type of crime and offender-victim racial 
composition on ratings of guilt likelihood, deserved punishment, sentencing 
recommendations after controlling for offender dangerousness, witness credibility, and 
hate motivation. Specifically, for those conditions labeled as hate crimes, there would be 
significantly higher means on the likelihood that the defendant committed aggravated 
battery and deserved punishment when the victim was African-American and the 
defendant was Caucasian.  However, for those conditions that are not labeled as hate 
crimes, there would be significantly higher means on the likelihood that the defendant 
committed aggravated battery and deserved punishment when the victim was Caucasian 
and the defendant was African-American.    
The results of these analyses revealed that after controlling for dangerousness, 
hate motivation, and witness credibility, there were no significant main effects observed 
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for type of crime (multivariate F (2, 76) = 0.083, p = .920), offender-victim racial 
composition (multivariate F (2, 76) = 0.211, p = .810), and interaction effects between 
these two variables (multivariate F (2, 76) = 2.305, p = .107) on ratings of guilt 
likelihood and deserved punishment. These findings supported hypothesis 3 and 4. 
However, they failed to support the hypothesis 5.  Regarding the covariates, both victim 
(multivariate F (2, 76) = .188, p = .829) and police credibility (multivariate F (2, 76) = 
1.383, p = .257) were non-significant, thus not supporting hypothesis 2a.  However, the 
tests of Between-Subjects Effects showed that dangerousness significantly impacted 
ratings of guilt likelihood (F (1, 77) = 43.577, p = .000) and deserved punishment (F (1, 
77) = 17.214, p = .000). The R2 value indicated that dangerousness explained 36% of the 
variance for guilt likelihood for aggravated battery and 18% of the variance for deserved 
punishment.  Additionally, hate motivation had a significant impact on ratings of 
deserved punishment (F (1, 77) = 9.815, p = .002).  The R2 value was .11, which 
indicated that hate motivation explained 11% of the variance for deserved punishment for 
aggravated battery.  Therefore, hypothesis 2 b. and 2c. were supported.  Although 
dangerousness is a legally relevant factor for deserved punishment, it should not be 
considered for guilt likelihood; however, the results suggested that dangerousness 
impacted guilt likelihood, as well as deserved punishment. See table 7 for details.  
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Table 7  
 
2 x 2 Factorial MANCOVA Summary Table for Hate Crime Study Examining Type of Crime, Victim-
Offender Racial Composition, and Interaction Effects on outcome variables after controlling for 
dangerousness, witness credibility, and hate motivation for Aggravated Battery. 
Fixed Factor  DV  SS  df MS  F       R2 
Dangerousness   Likelihood 104.047  1 104.047  43.577**  .36 
   Battery  
   Deserved 85.943  1 85.943  17.314*    .18 
   Punishment 
 
Hate Motivation Likelihood for .393  1 .393  .165      .00 
   Battery  
   Deserved 49.004  1 49.004  9.815**    .11 
   Punishment 
 
Victim   Likelihood for .739  1 .739  .310      .00 
Credibility  Battery  
   Deserved .799  1 .799  .160      .00 
   Punishment 
 
 Police   Likelihood for 5.604  1 5.604  2.347      .03 
Credibility  Battery  
   Deserved 5.427  1 5.427  1.087      .01 
   Punishment 
 
Type of   Likelihood for 9.145E-02 1 9.145E-02 .038      .00 
Crime   Battery  
   Deserved .446  1 .446  .089      .00 
   Punishment 
 
Offender-Victim Likelihood for .309  1 .309  .129      .00 
Race Composition Battery 
   Deserved .952  1 .952  .191      .00 
   Punishment 
 
Crime*Race  Likelihood for 10.735  1 10.735  4.496      .37 
   Battery 
   Deserved 4.440  1 4.440  .889      .01 
   Punishment 
n = 77;  
  *p < .05 
**p < .01 
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 Although the 2 x 2 Factorial ANOVA (presented above) demonstrated non-
significant findings related to sentencing, the Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) was 
computed to examine whether dangerousness, hate motivation, and witness credibility, 
were related to sentencing recommendations.  Recall that sentencing was computed 
separately to only examine those mock jurors that had found the defendant guilty for 
aggravated battery (n = 35).  In examining the results, dangerousness and witness 
credibility were non-significant.  However, hate motivation exerted a significant impact 
on sentencing (F (1, 35) = 6.958, p = .012).  This finding supported hypothesis 2c.  The 
R2 value was .17, which indicated that hate motivation explained 17% of the variance for 
sentence recommendations for aggravated battery.  See table 8 for details. 
Table 8  
 
2 x 2 Factorial MANCOVA Summary Table for Hate Crime Study Examining Type of Crime, Victim-
Offender Racial Composition, and Interaction Effects on Sentencing  after controlling for dangerousness, 
witness credibility, and hate motivation for Aggravated Battery. 
Fixed Factor  DV   SS df MS  F R2 
Dangerousness   Years in Prison  8.208 1 8.208  3.722 .10 
   For Battery  
Hate Motivation  Years in Prison  15.345 1 15.345  6.958* .17 
   For Battery  
Victim   Years in Prison  .497 1 .497  .225 .00 
Credibility  For Battery  
 Police   Years in Prison  .227 1 .227  .103 .00 
Credibility  For Battery 
Type of   Years in Prison  .197 1 .197  .089 .00 
Crime   For Battery  
Offender-Victim  Years in Prison  3.657 1 3.657  .017 .00 
Race Composition For Battery 
Crime*Race  Years in Prison  .927 1 .927  .421 .01 
   For Battery 
n = 35 
*p < .05 
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 Similar analyses were undertaken for the robbery charge variable.  The goal was 
to asses whether there would be main effects observed for type of crime (hate versus non-
hate), offender-victim racial composition (Caucasian/African-American), and the 
interaction between these variables on ratings of (1) likelihood of guilt adjudication, (2) 
recommended sentence, and (3) punishment recommendations for robbery.  The first 
analysis computed was a 2 x 2 Factorial MANOVA to examined mean differences in 
ratings of guilt adjudication and deserved punishment as a function of type of crime, 
offender-victim racial composition, or the interaction of the two variables for robbery 
before controlling for deserved punishment, witness credibility, and hate motivation (see 
Table 9).  
Table 9 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Hate Crime Study Examining Type of Crime, Victim-Offender 
Racial Composition, and Interaction Effects on Ratings of Likelihood of Guilt 
Adjudication and Deserved Punishment for Robbery. 
   Hate Crime Race  Mean  SD   N 
   Condition       
Likelihood for  Yes  BV/WD 5.44  2.03  16  
Robbery  Yes  WV/BD 6.58  2.66  26 
 
   No  BV/WD 5.24  2.98  25 
   No  WV/BD 4.38  2.69  21 
     
Deserved Punishment Yes  BV/WD 3.94  2.67  16 
For Robbery  Yes  WV/BD 4.19  3.37  26 
 
   No  BV/WD 4.20  3.35  25 
   No  WV/BD 2.48  2.40  21 
 
n = 83 
The multivariate results showed that there were no significant main effects 
observed for type of crime (multivariate F (2, 83) = 2.171, p = .121) offender-victim 
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racial composition (multivariate F (2, 83) = 1.423, p = .247), or an interaction effect 
between these two variables (multivariate F (2, 83) = 1.593, p = .209) on ratings of 
likelihood that the defendant committed robbery and deserved punishment.  These 
findings were not congruent with prior research, nor the hypotheses proposed for this 
study.  See table 10 for details on between-subjects effects. 
 
 
Table 10  
 
2 x 2 Factorial MANOVA Summary Table for Hate Crime Study Examining Type of 
Crime, Victim-Offender Racial Composition, and Interaction Effects on Ratings of 
Likelihood of Guilt Adjudication and Deserved Punishment for Robbery. 
 
Fixed Factor DV  SS  df MS  F  R2 
Type of  Likelihood  30.378  1 30.378  4.283  .05 
Crime  Robbery  
  Deserved 11.205  1 11.205  1.213  .01 
  Punishment 
 
O-V  Likelihood for .417  1 .417  .059  .00 
Race Comp. Robbery 
  Deserved 11.443  1 11.443  1.238  .02 
  Punishment 
 
Crime*Race Likelihood for 21.179  1 21.179  2.986  .03 
  Robbery 
  Deserved 20.760  1 20.760  2.247  .03 
  Punishment 
n = 83 
*p < .05 
 A 2 x 2 Factorial ANOVA was computed to examine main effects of type of 
crime, offender-victim racial composition, and the interaction between the two variables 
on ratings of recommended sentence for robbery separately.  The purpose of this analysis 
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was to examine the recommended sentence only for those mock jurors that had found the 
defendant guilty of robbery (n = 37).  The results demonstrated that there were non-
significant main effects for type of crime (multivariate F (1, 37) = 0.442, p = .510), 
offender-victim racial composition (multivariate F (1, 37) = 0.01, p = .972), and 
interaction effects between these two variables (multivariate F (1, 37) = 0.511, p = .479) 
on ratings of recommended sentence (years in prison for robbery).  See table 11 for the 
between-subjects effects. 
 
Table 11  
 
2 x 2 Factorial ANOVA Summary Table for Hate Crime Study Examining Type of Crime, 
Victim-Offender Racial Composition, and Interaction Effects on Ratings of Sentencing 
Recommendations for Robbery. 
 
Fixed Factor DV   SS df MS  F  R2 
Type of Years in Prison 1.929 1 1.929  .442  .01 
Crime  For Robbery  
 
O-V  Years in Prison 5.344 1 5.344  .001  .00 
Race Comp. For Robbery 
 
Crime*Race Years in Prison 2.230 1 2.230  .511  .01 
  For Robbery 
n = 37 
*p < .05 
Despite the non-significant findings with respect to robbery, a 2 x 2 Factorial 
MANCOVA was nonetheless performed to examine whether dangerousness, witness 
credibility, and hate motivation were related to guilt likelihood and deserved punishment 
for robbery. The second hypothesis indicated that the above mentioned covariates would 
impact guilt likelihood and deserved punishment.  Based on the preceding MANOVAs 
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(presented above), there was no reason to expect hypotheses three, four, or five would be 
supported in the following MANCOVA.  
The results indicated that the effect of witness credibility on likelihood of guilt 
and deserved punishment was non-significant.  However dangerousness (multivariate 
F(2, 76) = 21.419, p = .000) and hate motivation (multivariate F(2, 76) = 3.755, p = .028) 
were significant.  The tests of Between-Subjects Effects showed that dangerousness 
significantly impacted guilt likelihood (F (1, 77) = 40.745, p = .000) and deserved 
punishment (F (1, 77) = 18.990, p = .000).  The R2 value indicated that dangerousness 
explained 35% of the variance for guilt likelihood for robbery and 20% of the variance 
for deserved punishment.   Additionally, hate motivation significantly impacted deserved 
punishment (F (1, 77) = 6.136, p = .015).  The R2 value indicated that hate motivation 
explained 7% of the variance for deserved punishment for robbery.  These findings did 
not support hypothesis 2a.) that indicated that witness credibility would be significantly 
related to guilt likelihood, however hypothesis 2b. and 2c. were supported, which 
indicated that dangerousness and hate motivation would be significantly related to 
deserved punishment.  Although dangerousness is a legally relevant factor for deserved 
punishment, it should not be considered for guilt likelihood; however, the results 
suggested that dangerousness impacted guilt likelihood, as well as deserved punishment.  
As expected, because of the null findings in the previously computed 2 x 2 Factorial 
MANOVA, there were non-significant main effects observed for type of crime 
(multivariate F (1, 77) = 1.371, p = .260), offender-victim racial composition 
(multivariate F (1, 77) = .738, p = .481), and the interaction between these two variables 
(multivariate F (1, 77) = .032, p = .969) on ratings of likelihood for guilt adjudication for 
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robbery and deserved punishment after controlling for dangerousness, hate motivation, 
and witness credibility.  Therefore the third and fourth hypotheses were supported; 
however the fifth hypothesis was not supported.  See table 12 for between-subjects 
effects. 
 The second 2 x 2 Factorial ANCOVA was computed to examine whether 
dangerousness, hate motivation, and witness credibility were related to sentencing for 
robbery. The hypothesis indicated that the dangerousness and hate motivation would 
impact sentencing.  Sentencing was computed separately to only examine those mock 
jurors that had found the defendant guilty for robbery (n = 35).  Interestingly, the results 
did not support the hypothesis 2c.; the findings showed that hate motivation, and witness 
credibility did not significantly relate to sentencing.  However, hypothesis 2b. was 
supported as the results showed that dangerousness was significantly related to sentence 
recommendations for robbery (F (1, 35) = 8.618, p = .006).  The R2 value was .20, which 
indicated that dangerousness explained 20% of the variance for sentence 
recommendations for robbery.  As expected because of the null findings in the previously 
computed 2 x 2 Factorial ANOVA, the results of these analyses supported the third and 
fourth hypothesis, however the fifth hypothesis was not supported, illustrating that after 
controlling for dangerousness, hate motivation, and witness credibility, there were no 
main effects observed for type of crime (F (1, 35) = 0.240, p = .628), offender-victim 
racial composition (F (1, 35) = 0.170, p = .683), and the interaction between the two 
variables F (1, 35) = 0.010, p = .919) on ratings of sentencing recommendations for 
robbery.  See table 13 for between-subjects effects. 
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Table 12  
 
2 x 2 Factorial MANCOVA Summary Table for Hate Crime Study Examining Type of Crime, 
Victim-Offender Racial Composition, and Interaction Effects on outcome variables after 
controlling for dangerousness, witness credibility, and hate motivation for Robbery. 
Fixed Factor  DV  SS  df MS  F       R2 
Dangerousness   Likelihood  163.354 1 163.354 40.745**   .35 
   Robbery 
   Deserved 115.881 1 115.881 18.995**   .20 
   Punishment 
 
Hate Motivation Likelihood  9.028E-03 1 9.028E-03 .002      .00 
   Robbery 
   Deserved 37.432  1 37.432  6.136*      .07 
   Punishment 
 
Victim   Likelihood  1.137  1 1.137  .284      .00 
Credibility  Robbery  
   Deserved 3.387  1 3.387  .555      .00 
   Punishment 
 
 Police   Likelihood  5.947E-03 1 5.947E-03 .001      .00 
Credibility  Robbery 
   Deserved 1.697  1 1.697  .287      .00 
   Punishment 
 
Type of Crime   Likelihood  7.643  1 7.643  1.906      .02 
   Robbery   
   Deserved .249  1 .249  .041      .00 
   Punishment 
 
Offender-Victim Likelihood  5.465  1 5.465  1.363      .02 
Race Composition Robbery 
   Deserved .262  1 .262  .043      .00 
   Punishment 
 
Crime* Race  Likelihood  7.020E-04 1 7.020E-04 .000      .00 
   Robbery 
   Deserved .330  1 .330  .054      .00 
   Punishment 
n = 77 
   *p < .05 
 **p < .01 
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Table 13  
 
2 x 2 Factorial ANCOVA Summary Table for Hate Crime Study Examining Type of 
Crime, Victim-Offender Racial Composition, and Interaction Effects on Sentencing  after 
controlling for dangerousness, witness credibility, and hate motivation for Robbery. 
 
Fixed Factor  DV  SS  df MS  F R2 
Dangerousness  Years in Prison34.614  1 34.614  8.618**.20 
   For Robbery  
Hate Motivation Years in Prison10.752  1 10.752  2.677 .07 
   For Robbery  
Victim   Years in Prison3.226  1 3.226  .803 .02 
Credibility  For Robbery  
 Police   Years in Prison.926  1 .926  .231 .00 
Credibility  For Robbery 
 
Type of  Years in Prison.962  1 .962  .240 .00 
Crime   For Robbery  
 
Offender-Victim Years in Prison.682  1 .682  .170 .00 
Race Composition For Robbery 
 
Crime*Race  Years in Prison4.195  1 4.195 .010  .00 
   For Robbery 
n = 35 
**p< .01 
 Overall, these findings suggested that some of the covariates were significantly 
related to some of the outcomes. More specifically, witness credibility did not impact 
guilt adjudication, deserved punishment, and sentencing.  However dangerousness 
impacted guilt adjudication and deserved punishment for both robbery and aggravated 
battery.  Additionally, hate motivation impacted deserved punishment for both 
aggravated battery and robbery.  Interestingly, hate motivation only impacted sentencing 
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for aggravated battery; no effect was observed for robbery.  The results also demonstrated 
that before controlling for the above mentioned covariates, there were no main effects 
observed for type of crime (hate versus non-hate) and offender-victim racial composition 
(Caucasian/African-American). While these null effects were predicted in the current 
study, it was hypothesized that they would significantly interact. However, after 
including the covariates in the model, the interaction effect on ratings of guilt likelihood 
was no longer significant, contrary to the proposed hypotheses.  There were no other 
interactions observed for the other dependant variables (deserved punishment and 
sentencing recommendations).  Collectively, there was only partial support across the 
various hypotheses in the current analysis, a pattern which will be discussed in greater 
detail in the conclusions.  
Supplemental Analyses 
 As indicated in the previous analyses, some of the hypotheses were not supported 
in the current study.  While prior studies had previously indicated that the race and hate 
crime manipulations impacted guilt adjudication, deserved punishment, and sentencing, 
these results were not observed in this study.  In fact, after covariates were included in the 
models, none of the manipulated variables, nor their interactions, were significantly 
related to the outcomes. This was not only inconsistent with the hypotheses, but seems 
inconsistent with the bivariate analyses. Specifically, there were significant differences in 
the adjudication of guilt observed in the chi-square analyses.  Although it was suspected 
that the interaction between type of crime and victim-offender racial composition was 
driving this, the multivariate analyses failed to support such a conclusion. In an effort to 
further explore the data, and perhaps get some sense of what might have influenced mock 
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jurors’ decisions about guilt, a One-Way ANOVA was computed to determine whether 
there were mean differences in perceptions of dangerousness and hate motivation across 
the conditions.   
 The results showed a non-significant finding for dangerousness across the 
conditions, indicating that perceptions of dangerousness did not vary across the 
conditions.  However, there were mean differences for hate motivation across the four 
conditions (F (3, 87) = 3.299, p = .024).  To further examine to which of the four groups 
significantly differed from each other, Bonferroni pairwise comparison tests were 
conducted.  The results indicated that condition 1 (African-American victim/Caucasian 
defendant; hate crime) and condition 4 (Caucasian victim/African-American defendant; 
non-hate crime scenario) significantly differed from each other; thus, mock jurors were 
more likely believe that the African-American victim was targeted because of hate 
motivation when the defendant was Caucasian in the hate crime condition, in comparison 
to when the victim was Caucasian and the defendant was African-American in the non-
hate crime condition. This is congruent with the suggested theories on stereotypes that 
propose that the victim’s race and calling the crime a hate crime influenced mock juror’s 
perception of hate motivation.  All other pairwise comparisons for the hate motivation 
were non-significant (see Table 14).   
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Table 14 
 
Pairwise Group Comparisons of Hate Motivation Across Conditions 
      
DV  Comparison     Mean   SE  
        Difference 
Hate Motive  Hate (BV/WD) hate (WV/BD)  3.21   1.43 
     Inter-R (BV/WD) 2.85   1.43 
     Inter-R (WV/BD) 4.58*   1.48 
 
  Hate (WV/BD) Hate (BV/WD) -3.21   1.42 
     Inter-R (BV/WD) -.36   1.28 
     Inter-R (WV/BD) 1.36   1.34 
 
  Inter-R (BV/WD) Hate (BV/WD) -2.85   1.43 
     Hate (WV/BD) .36   1.28 
     Inter-R (WV/BD) 1.73   1.34 
 
  Inter-R (WV/BD) Hate (BV/WD) -4.58*   1.48 
     Hate (WV/BD) -1.37   1.34 
     Inter-R (BV/WD) -1.73   1.34 
n = 87 
P < .05* 
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Chapter Six 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The aim of this study was to examine the influence of labeling a crime as a hate 
crime, the victim-offender racial composition, and their interaction on mock jurors’ 
perceptions and decision making.  Specifically, the objective was to examine whether 
there were main effects observed for the type of crime (hate versus non-hate), offender-
victim racial composition (Caucasian/African-American) and the interaction between 
these two variables on ratings for guilt likelihood, how much punishment the defendant 
deserved, and sentence recommendations after controlling potential covariates.  There 
were five broad hypotheses in this study.  The first hypothesis stated that differences in 
guilt and hate crime adjudications would emerge across the experimental conditions.  
This hypothesis was based on previous research that had focused on the influence of 
racial salience (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000; Marcus-Newhall et al., 2002).  The second 
hypothesis indicated that dangerousness, hate motivation, and witness credibility would 
exert significant influences as well.  This second series of hypotheses was important in 
that previous research has not included them as potentially covarying factors when 
examining adjudication and sentencing outcomes.  Thus, previous research which has 
suggested racially salient crimes are reacted to differently may be misleading to the 
extent that other factors (e.g., perceptions of dangerousness) are driving mock jurors’ 
decision-making.  The third and fourth hypothesis stated that there would be no main 
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effects observed for type of crime (hate versus non-hate) and offender-victim racial 
composition (Caucasian/African-American) on ratings of likelihood the defendant 
committed aggravated battery and robbery, how much punishment the defendant 
deserved, and sentence recommendations.  The fifth hypothesis suggested that there 
would be an interaction between type of crime (hate versus non-hate) and offender-victim 
racial composition (Caucasian offender/African-American victim versus African-
American offender/Caucasian victim) on ratings of the likelihood the defendant 
committed aggravated battery and robbery, how much punishment the defendant 
deserved, and sentence recommendations.  The statistical analyses used in this study 
including descriptive statistics, correlations, Chi-Squares, 2 x 2 Factorial Multivariate 
Analyses of Variance, and 2 x 2 Factorial Multivariate Analyses of Covariance. 
First, correlational analyses were computed to determine whether the potential 
covariates were correlated with the outcome variables.  As expected, dangerousness, hate 
motivation, and witness credibility (police and victim) were significantly related to 
likelihood of guilt, how much punishment the defendant deserved, and sentencing.  Thus, 
these findings suggested that these factors were related to jurors’ decision-making, and 
therefore should have been included in previous research.  For the purposes of this study, 
dangerousness, hate motivation, and witness credibility were included in the multivariate 
analyses.  The purpose for including these factors as covariates was to examine the true 
independent effects of race or the hate crime manipulation on ratings of guilt likelihood, 
how much punishment the defendant deserved, and sentencing recommendations.  
However, attractiveness was not significantly related to any of the outcome variables.  
Therefore, for the purposes of computing the multivariate analyses, attractiveness was not 
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included as a covarying factor.  After establishing these relationships, I proceeded to 
examine the several hypotheses suggested.  
In the first hypothesis, I anticipated that there would be differences in 
adjudication across cells in the experimental conditions.  Specifically, it was expected 
that the distribution of guilt adjudication for aggravated battery and robbery would 
significantly vary across the four study conditions.  Additionally, the distribution of hate 
adjudication would significantly vary across the first two hate crime experimental 
conditions.  Although no specific a priori hypotheses were generated regarding the 
specific pattern of results in these chi-square analyses, the general patterns appeared to be 
inconsistent with what one might expect. For example, mock jurors appeared to render 
more guilty verdicts to the African-American defendant in comparison to the Caucasian 
defendant in the hate crime scenario for aggravated battery.  Conversely, in the non-hate 
crime condition, mock jurors rendered more guilty verdicts to the Caucasian defendant, in 
comparison to the African-American defendant for aggravated battery.  It is unclear as to 
exactly what may have led to these general patterns, although the combined influence of 
the type of crime and the victim-offender relationship would appear to be implicated. 
This conclusion is consistent with the multivariate analysis of variance, which showed a 
positive interaction effect between type of crime (hate vs. non-hate) and offender-victim 
racial composition (African-American / Caucasian) on ratings of guilt likelihood.  
Additionally, the estimated marginal means suggested a similar pattern to what was 
observed in the chi-square.  Thus, it appears that the interaction effect did have an impact 
on guilt adjudication for battery.  Importantly, however, this interaction was rendered 
non-significant after the inclusion of the covariates.   
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The chi-square analysis for robbery was non-significant indicating that the 
distribution of guilt adjudication across experimental conditions did not significantly 
vary.  It appears that this non-significant finding may have been a consequence of the 
limited evidence available in the trial scenarios related to robbery.  It is possible that if 
there was more evidence that the defendant committed robbery – for instance, if the 
stolen items were found in the defendant’s possession – it is plausible that guilt 
adjudication for robbery would have also significantly varied across study conditions. 
In addition to adjudications for guilt, I also asked mock jurors to adjudicate 
whether or not they perceived those crimes labeled as hate crimes as actual hate crimes. 
The results regarding this adjudication were quite interesting in that mock jurors were 
more likely to adjudicate the crimes as hate crimes when they conformed to stereotypical 
views of what constitutes a hate crime. For instance, statistics show that Caucasians are 
generally perpetrators of hate crimes and African-Americans are most frequently victims 
of hate crimes.  Such occurrences create stereotypes that result in people commonly 
believing that hate crimes are generally committed by Caucasians against African-
Americans (Craig et al., 1999; Saucier et al., 2006; Gerstenfeld, 2003; Marcus-Newhall et 
al., 2002).  Interestingly, the results indicated that more mock jurors believed the crime 
was a hate crime when the victim was African-American and the defendant was 
Caucasian, in comparison to when the victim was Caucasian and the defendant was 
African-American.  This observed result is congruent with prior suggestions that hate 
crimes are stereotypically viewed as crimes against African-Americans (Craig et al., 
1999; Saucier et al., 2006; Gerstenfeld, 2003; Marcus-Newhall et al., 2002). 
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The second series of hypotheses indicated that dangerousness, witness credibility, 
and hate motivation would be related to guilt adjudication, ratings of how much 
punishment the defendant deserved, and sentencing recommendations. The results 
suggested that some of these hypotheses were supported, while others were not.  First, I 
expected that perceptions of witness credibility (police and victim) would be significantly 
related to ratings of the likelihood that the defendant committed aggravated battery and 
robbery.  Interestingly, the results suggested that witness credibility did not impact guilt 
adjudication, how much punishment the defendant deserved, and sentencing.  While 
witness credibility should be a legally relevant factor taken into consideration in criminal 
cases, the results suggested that it did not have any influence on the outcomes.  This null 
finding may be explained by evidence strength.  Perhaps the testimony provided by both 
the police and victim in the crime scenarios was perceived as being weak by mock jurors, 
and thus inconsequential in affecting guilt adjudication, how much punishment the 
defendant deserved, and sentencing.   
Second, it was hypothesized that perceptions of offender dangerousness would be 
significantly related to sentence recommendations and how much punishment the mock 
jurors believed the defendant deserved for aggravated battery and robbery.  As expected, 
the results indicated that dangerousness impacted how much punishment the defendant 
deserved and sentence recommendations for both robbery and aggravated battery crimes.  
Dangerousness accounted for approximately 18% of the variance for perceptions of 
deserved punishment.  Additionally, dangerousness accounted for 10% and 20% of the 
variance for sentencing recommendations for aggravated battery and robbery 
respectively.  The findings also suggested that dangerousness influenced guilt likelihood 
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for aggravated battery and robbery.  Dangerousness explained approximately 35% of the 
variance for likelihood for battery and robbery.  It emerged that dangerousness seemed to 
have accounted for a considerable amount of variance for both crimes.  While 
dangerousness is a legally relevant factor for sentencing recommendations and how much 
punishment the defendant deserved, it appeared that dangerousness was an influential 
factor that also impacted guilt adjudication.  This suggests that mock jurors associated 
perceptions of offender dangerousness with guilt culpability.   
Finally, the hypothesis suggested that perceptions of hate motivation would be 
significantly related to recommendations for severity of punishment for aggravated 
battery and robbery. As expected, the findings suggested that hate motivation impacted 
how much punishment the defendant deserved for both aggravated and robbery crimes.  
Additionally, hate motivation accounted for 11% and 7% of the variation for aggravated 
battery and robbery respectively.  Interestingly, however, hate motivation only impacted 
sentencing for aggravated battery and accounted for 17% of the variation; no effect was 
observed for robbery.  The non-significant finding for hate motivation’s impact on 
sentencing for robbery may have been related to the nature of the crime and the 
availability of evidence.  That is, mock jurors may have perceived aggravated battery as a 
crime stereotypically motivated by hate.  However, the robbery may have not been 
considered to be motivated by racial animus.  Additionally, the scenario focused on 
evidence related to the aggravated battery, however there was very limited evidence in 
the case that suggested that robbery took place; for instance, there was very little mention 
about robbery in the crime scenario and there was no indication that the stolen property 
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was found in the defendant’s possession. As such, this weak evidence may have impacted 
the outcomes.  
The final series of hypotheses suggested that there would be no main effects 
observed for type of crime (hate versus non-hate) and offender-victim racial composition 
(Caucasian/African-American) on ratings of likelihood the defendant committed 
aggravated battery and robbery, how much punishment the defendant deserved, and 
sentence recommendations.  As predicted, the 2 x 2 Factorial Multivariate Analyses 
revealed that there were no significant main effects observed.  Therefore, this finding 
suggests that the type of crime alone (hate versus non-hate) and the offender-victim racial 
dyad alone (African-American/Caucasian) did not impact how much punishment the 
defendant deserved, guilt likelihood, and sentencing recommendations.    
The final series of hypotheses also suggested that there would be an interaction 
between type of crime (hate versus non-hate) and offender-victim racial composition 
(Caucasian offender/African-American victim versus African-American 
offender/Caucasian victim) on ratings of the likelihood the defendant committed 
aggravated battery and robbery, how much punishment the defendant deserved, and 
sentence recommendations.  Specifically, for those conditions labeled as hate crimes, 
there would be significantly higher means on likelihood for committing both crimes, 
sentence recommendations, and how much punishment the defendant deserved when the 
victim was African-American and the defendant was Caucasian (compared to when the 
victim was Caucasian and the defendant was African-American).  Conversely, for those 
conditions labeled as non-hate crimes, there would be significantly higher means on 
likelihood for committing both crimes, how much punishment the defendant deserved, 
 79 
and sentence recommendations when the victim was Caucasian and the defendant was 
African-American (compared to when the victim was African-American and the 
defendant was Caucasian). A 2 x 2 Factorial MANOVA revealed that there was an 
interaction effect on ratings of likelihood that the defendant committed aggravated 
battery before controlling for the covariates in the model.  This interaction demonstrated 
that the crime label and racial dyad did interact.  However, the interaction demonstrated 
that in the hate crime condition, the mean likelihood that the defendant committed the 
crime was higher when the offender was African-American and the victim was 
Caucasian, compared to when the offender was Caucasian and the victim was African-
American.  These outcomes were not consistent with the direction predicted in the 
hypothesis for hate crimes.  A plausible suggestion to this outcome may be related to 
some criticisms that have been suggested for hate crime legislation. Some researchers 
have suggested that hate crime laws may have an adverse affect on minority group 
members (Jacobs & Potter, 1997).  For instance, African-Americans may receive harsher 
sentences for committing a hate crime against a member of the majority group 
(Caucasians) as research has shown a trend whereby minority group members receive 
harsher sentences than members of the majority groups (Saucier et al., 2006; Gerstenfeld, 
2003).  The results in this study suggest that this criticism may be plausible.    
Conversely, the results indicated that in the non-hate crime condition, the mean 
likelihood that the defendant committed aggravated battery was higher when the offender 
was Caucasian and the victim was African-American, compared to when the offender 
was African-American and the victim was Caucasian.  This outcome was also not 
congruent with the direction predicted in the hypothesis.  A potential reason for this 
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outcome could have been that students may have realized that the study was exploring the 
potential impact of race on juror decision making.  The students may have been aware of 
known race-related imprisonment issues that suggest that African-Americans are more 
frequently found guilty of crimes and receive harsher sentences (Clear, 1994).  
Consequently guilt likelihood was increased in the opposite direction where Caucasians 
were more likely to be guilty when the victim was African-American, in comparison to 
the African-American defendant when the victim was Caucasian.  Interestingly, however, 
after controlling for offender dangerousness, witness credibility, and hate motivation, the 
interaction effect disappeared.  Therefore, the significant interaction between type of 
crimes (hate/non-hate) and offender-victim racial composition (African-
American/Caucasian) on ratings of guilt likelihood may have been a function of the 
covariates indicated above.  Thus, prior research that has suggested differences in 
adjudication and sentencing in hate crimes may have been inaccurate as the findings may 
have been a function of other potentially covarying factors.   
The series of 2 x 2 Factorial MANCOVAs revealed that after controlling for 
dangerousness, witness credibility, and hate motivation, there were no observed main 
effects of type of crime and offender-victim racial composition, and there were no 
interaction effects between these two variables on ratings of likelihood the defendant 
committed aggravated battery and robbery, how much punishment the defendant 
deserved, and sentencing recommendations.  The results of the main effects were 
congruent with the hypothesis in this study; however the interaction effects observed 
were not.  While the hypotheses in this study suggested significant differences across 
groups because of the victim-offender racial composition and hate crime label 
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manipulation, this was not supported with these results, and was not congruent with prior 
hate crime research studies (Craig et al., 1999; Saucier et al., 2006; Gerstenfeld, 2003; 
Marcus-Newhall et al., 2002).  Prior researchers have suggested that race and the hate 
crime manipulation influenced adjudication and sentencing.  However, the important note 
to consider is that prior researchers have not controlled for potential covarying factors 
that influence these outcomes.  As such, the significant results found in prior research 
may have essentially been a function of the covarying factors, not the actual race or hate 
crime manipulation.  The current study focused on controlling for potential covarying 
factors that have been suggested to influence adjudication and sentencing.  The main 
effect effects and interactions did not impact the outcomes; rather, it appeared that 
offender dangerousness and hate motivation were influential factors in this case.  Witness 
credibility remained constant across the conditions as there was no significant variation 
observed, suggesting that witness credibility did not influence mock jurors perceptions of 
adjudication and sentencing depending on which condition they were assigned to. 
Although, it is important to note that dangerousness did influence guilt likelihood, this 
factor should not be a legally relevant factor considered by jurors in assessing guilt. 
Since we found that mock jurors in this study focused on offender dangerousness 
and hate motivation, there was further interest to determine whether these factors differed 
across the conditions.   There was a possibility that perhaps calling a crime a hate crime 
alters perceptions of offender dangerousness or perceptions of hate motivation.  Or the 
race of the victim impacts whether the crime is perceived as being motivated by hate.  
While this hypothesis was not suggested in this study, to further analyze the results, a 
One-Way ANOVA was computed to determine mean differences for dangerousness and 
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perceived hate motivation across the conditions.  The results showed that perceptions of 
dangerousness did not vary across the conditions.  However, the results showed that 
mock jurors were more likely to believe that the African-American victim was targeted 
because of hate motivation when the defendant was Caucasian in the hate crime 
condition, in comparison to when the victim was Caucasian and the defendant was 
African-American in the non-hate crime condition.  Therefore, this suggests that the 
victim’s race and calling the crime a hate crime influenced mock juror’s perception of 
hate motivation.  This is congruent with the notion that there are stereotypes about what a 
hate crime is (Craig et al., 1999; Saucier et al., 2006; Gerstenfeld, 2003; Marcus-Newhall 
et al., 2002).  Specifically, it appears that the stereotype of a hate crime is one in which 
there is an African-American victim and a Caucasian offender.  
While interesting results emerged in this study, the results were not congruent 
with prior hate crime research.  Several reasons may explain the outcomes observed in 
the current study.  Perhaps the inconsistent results obtained in the study were impacted by 
specifically labeling crimes as hate crimes, or the inclusion of multiple victim-offender 
racial dyads.  Other research has not typically created such unique experimental 
conditions, and those in turn may have influenced the results.  Perhaps it was something 
about they way the crime was described in the trial scenario that impacted the results.  
These are all possibilities; however it remains unclear as to why they seem contrary to 
prior research.       
Another consideration for why these results emerged may have been related to the 
sample.  The study was selected from undergraduate criminology students.  Criminology 
classes focus on issues related to extralegal factors (such as race), imprisonment, and 
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other legal issues.  Such factors may have played a role in mock juror’s considerations for 
likelihood of guilt, how much punishment the defendant deserved, and sentence 
recommendations because of the sensitivity regarding shockingly high imprisonment 
rates in the last 30 years (Clear, 1994).  As a result, mock jurors in this study sample may 
have been less likely to adjudicate the defendants guilty, less likely to believe they 
deserved punishment, and decreased recommended sentences in comparison to a sample 
of non-criminology students or community samples.  This may be indicative of prior 
studies that have found significant results related to increased adjudication and 
sentencing for Caucasian perpetrators for hate crimes in comparison to African-American 
perpetrators as the samples used were non-criminology student samples, such as 
psychology student samples or community samples (Craig et al., 1999; Saucier et al., 
2006; Gerstenfeld, 2003; Marcus-Newhall et al., 2002).   
A final consideration may be that the evidence presented for robbery negatively 
impacted the outcomes in this study.  The crime scenario focused on evidence related to 
aggravated battery.  There was very limited information provided for the robbery.  In 
particular, no information was provided that indicated whether belongings were found in 
the defendant’s possession.  Given that the primary factor related to jurors’ decision is the 
strength of evidence (Sargent & Bradfield, 2004), and the evidence regarding burglary 
was admittedly weak, the nonsignificant findings regarding robbery may have been 
appropriate. 
In summary, the current study revealed some very interesting findings that added 
to existing literature.  Essentially, what this body of research previously suggested prior 
to this study was that race was a factor that influenced adjudication and sentencing.  In 
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race and jury studies, prior researchers have suggested that African-Americans tend to be 
found guilty more frequently and receive harsher sentences.  However, when race is 
made salient, mock jurors tend to pay attention to legally relevant details of the case.  In 
hate crime and jury research, when race is made salient, prior researchers have suggested 
that mock jurors tend to be more punitive towards Caucasian perpetrators of hate crimes 
when the victim is African-American.  What had not yet been examined prior to this 
study was whether these patterns hold when covariates that may modify the findings are 
controlled for.  For the purposes of this study, hate motivation (which was a combination 
of whether the victim was targeted because of race and the defendant’s perceived 
prejudice), witness credibility (police and victim) and dangerousness (which was a 
combination of the defendant’s perceived aggressiveness and likelihood of future crime) 
were controlled for, as prior research has suggested that these factors influence 
adjudication and sentencing.  The results of this study found no differences in mock 
juror’s decisions about how much punishment the defendant deserved, and sentence 
recommendations before and after holding all the covariates constant.  However, there 
was a significant interaction between type of crime and offender-victim racial 
composition observed on ratings of guilt likelihood for aggravated battery only (non-
significant for robbery) before controlling for the covariates in the model.  Conversely, 
after controlling for offender dangerousness, witness credibility, and hate motivation the 
interaction effect disappeared.  Thus, it appears that while prior researchers have 
suggested that race is a factor, the present study suggests that mock jurors are not 
influenced by race.  This outcome in the study is a positive and important outcome to 
note.  In fact, the influential factors on guilt adjunction, how much punishment the 
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defendant deserved, and sentencing appeared to be the covarying factors such as 
dangerousness and hate motivation. 
Some flaws were identified in this study.  First and foremost, some sampling 
issues were noted.  The sample was not diverse, as 66.7% of mock jurors were 
Caucasian.  There were less than 25 participants in each condition, indicating that the 
sample size was small.   The sample selected was comprised of college students.  While 
numerous researchers use college student samples, it decreases external validity 
(Sommers & Adekanmbi, 2008).   Sampling is an important component for consideration 
for future research.  Specifically, researchers should focus on more diverse and larger 
sample sizes.  Since the African-American population in the United States is lower than 
the Caucasian population, it is likely that a diverse sample will be difficult to obtain. 
Therefore, future researchers should focus on obtaining a survey that is stratified to 
include more diverse samples.  Additionally, samples should be selected from an actual 
jury pool in order to increase external validity.  
There is very limited research in the area of hate crimes and jury decision making.  
Thus, it is necessary to continue conducting further studies to examine juror’s perceptions 
of hate crimes to increase knowledge in this area.  One consideration for future research 
involves strength of presented evidence.  Prior researchers have noted differences in 
adjudication and sentencing depending on evidence strength (Sargent & Bradfield, 2004).  
In the current study, the percentage of guilty adjudications was approximately 50%. This 
suggests that the evidence was ambiguous as intended. However, a more sophisticated 
design could include varying levels of strength of evidence, an approach future 
researchers should consider.   
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Despite the limitations, this study adds to the literature as key covarying factors 
were identified, such as offender dangerousness and hate motivation. These covariates 
were influential on ratings of guilt adjudication, perceptions of how much punishment the 
defendant deserved, and sentence recommendations.  Because prior studies have not 
taken into account such factors, some of the findings stemming from them may be 
misspecified.  We encourage future efforts to examine these and other potential 
covariates, as they appear to be important. To the extent that the current findings are 
replicated, it may reveal that race is less influential than previously thought. This would 
be an encouraging finding as jurors are charged with carrying out their duties in an 
impartial, and thus racially neutral, manner.  
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